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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Public policy favors testamentary bequests to charity. At least, that is the claim of 
numerous courts and legislative bodies. The policy favoring charitable bequests may tip 
the scales in deciding the proper interpretation of a will or the merits of an undue 
influence, or incapacity claim. Paradoxically, courts and legislative bodies rarely discuss 
the source of this public policy.1 Nor do they inquire into the wisdom of the policy.2 They 
should.  
 
In the coming years, we will see a staggering amount of money change hands as a 
result of death—mainly thanks to the Baby Boomers.3 The Boomers will receive 
inheritances of about $8.4 trillion from their own parents.4 In turn, the Boomers are 
expected to leave $30 trillion to their own heirs.5 Death, it seems, is now an important 
part of many financial plans. “Many boomers…have been lagging behind in their 
savings, betting on—hoping for—big bequests, especially since many of them suffered 
                                                
1 See, e.g., In re Stalp, 359 N.Y.S.2d 749, 753 (1974) (“It requires no extended discussion 
of local (New York) law to establish that our public policy favors charitable giving.”); In 
re Estate of Baum, 418 Pa. 404, FN 2 (1965) (“It is difficult to conceive of a 
Commonwealth public policy that is more fundamental or more meaningful than its 
frequently restated policy of encouragement to charities and charitable giving in the 
public interest.”). 
2 See id. 
3 Baby boomers are “[m]embers of the large generation born from 1946 to 1964.” Baby 
Boomers: The Gloomiest Generation, Pew Research, available at 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2008/06/25/baby-boomers-the-gloomiest-generation/. 
4 See METLIFE MATURE MARKETS INSTITUTE, THE METLIFE STUDY OF INHERITANCE AND 
WEALTH TRANSFER TO BABY BOOMERS 2 (2010) [hereinafter METLIFE]. 
5 See ACCENTURE, THE “GREATER” WEALTH TRANSFER: CAPITALIZING ON THE 
INTERGENERATIONAL SHIFT IN WEALTH 1 (2012) [hereinafter ACCENTURE]. 
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big losses in 2008.”6 Whether they will actually receive those bequests is an entirely 
different question. Some experts believe that increases in average life expectancy and the 
associated costs will result in many Americans outliving their savings.7 But, there is 
another, less obvious reason why would-be heirs should not count on receiving an 
inheritance from their parents: charities and non-profit organizations. Heirs are not the 
only ones banking on their parents’ deaths. Charities are also banking on the Baby 
Boomer wealth transfer—predicting a “golden age of philanthropy.”8 Unlike the typical 
heir, however, charities are in the business of soliciting gratuitous transfers—often quite 
aggressively. The potential for conflict between would-be heirs and charities should be 
obvious, yet little scholarship considers the issue. 
 
 The public policy favoring testamentary bequests to charities is well established 
in the law. However, that public policy can and does conflict with other equally well-
founded public policies. When confronted with this conflict, courts are often dismissive 
or even hostile towards the parties seeking to challenge a testamentary bequest to a 
charity. I argue that the policy favoring charitable giving has gone too far and has, in 
                                                
6 Anne Tergesen, Counting on an Inheritance? Count Again. WALL ST. J., June 11, 2012, 
available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303990604577370001234970954.html. 
See also, Steve Ronsen, Kids and Money: If You Plan to Leave and Inheritance, Manage 
Expectations, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 14, 2013, available at 
http://www.sacbee.com/2013/10/14/5819662/kids-and-money-if-you-plan-to.html 
7 Tergesen, supra note 5. 
8 Richard C. Morais, Huge Wave in Charitable Giving Still Coming, FORBES, October 2, 
2009, available at http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/02/estate-tax-bill-gates-boston-
college-personal-finance-bc.html.; See also Julia Love, These Days, Colleges Urge 
Young Alumni to Give…Posthumously, 58 CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Issue 42, 
at A20 (Aug. 3, 2012). 
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some instances, undermined other important public policies. Specifically, courts and 
legislators have strengthened the charitable bequest policy without giving enough 
consideration to other, equally important public policies. This problem is not new. 
History shows that similar policy conflicts have arisen periodically since late antiquity—
if not earlier. The parameters of the problem, however, are somewhat new. The 
governing law, available technologies, and familial relationships have certainly evolved 
since the time of late antiquity. This article examines how the public policy favoring 
charitable bequests conflicts with various aspects of the equally important public policies 
of testamentary freedom and family protection.   
 
 Part II considers the competing public policies of testamentary freedom, family 
protection, and charitable bequests as well as the existing legal doctrines aimed at 
furthering these policies. Part III examines the social and legal origins of charitable 
bequests and the periodic attempts to balance charitable bequests with other important 
policy considerations. Part IV examines the role of the non-profit sector in America 
today. Specifically, Part IV considers the size and scope of the nonprofit industry, the 
legal and economic benefits the nonprofit industry enjoys, and the manner in which 
nonprofits solicit charitable bequests. Part V illustrates how the current law fails to strike 
the appropriate balance between the competing policies. The current law is too favorable 
to charities and reform is needed.   Part VI concludes. 
II. COMPETING PUBLIC POLICIES 
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American law favors charitable giving, testamentary freedom, and family protection 
as matters of public policy. For thousands of years Western society has struggled to strike 
the appropriate balance between these competing concerns. Today, a number of laws and 
doctrines promote and protect these public policy concerns. 
A. Freedom of Testation.  
In every American jurisdiction, “[t]he first principle in the law of wills is freedom 
of testation.”9 At its core, testamentary freedom means that a “testator may dispose of his 
property as he pleases, and that he may indulge his prejudice against his relations and in 
favor of strangers, and that, if he does so, it is no objection to his will.”10 Looking to state 
statutes and centuries of jurisprudence, numerous courts have described freedom of 
testation as a matter of public policy.11 A variety of laws and doctrines protect this 
fundamental organizing principal. For example, in order to exercise testamentary rights, 
the testator must (1) possess testamentary capacity at the time he executes the 
testament,12 and (2) execute the testament in compliance with the form prescribed by law. 
Although the nuances of these requirements vary by state, the object of both is to 
safeguard, among other things, testamentary freedom.  
 
                                                
9 John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 
491 (1975). 
10 Breeden v. Stone, 992 P. 2d 1167, 1170 (Colo. 2000).  
11 See, e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg, 235 Ill. 2d 256, 265 (2009) (“[O]ur statutes clearly 
reveal a public policy in support of testamentary freedom.”); U.S. Nat. Bank of Portland 
v. Snodgrass, 275 P. 2d 860, 866 (Or. 1954) (en banc) (“[W]e submit that taken together 
they reveal a long-accepted pattern of public attitude and public policy in this state 
respecting an almost unrestricted right to dispose of one’s property on death.”); Monroe 
v. Barclay, 17 Ohio St. 302, 316 (1867) (“[I]t is the policy of the law to secure to every 
one the right to dispose of his property in accordance with his individual will.”). 
12 See, e.g., Dean v. Jordan, 194 79 P. 2d 331, 335 (Wash. 1938). 
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Three interrelated concepts aimed at ensuring freedom of testation are important 
for our purposes: (1) the doctrine of undue influence; (2) the prohibition on a beneficiary 
of a testament from serving as a witness or assisting in the preparation of the testament; 
and (3) related attorney ethics rules.  
1. Undue Influence.  
 
To ensure that the decedent’s testament represents the true expression of his will, 
his testament may be set aside if it was procured through fraud, duress, or, most 
commonly, undue influence.13 Although the undue influence doctrine and the related 
evidentiary issues vary from state-to-state, the essential thrust of the doctrine is to ensure 
freedom of testation. Undue influence invalidates a testament executed in proper form by 
a person possessing testamentary capacity because the “testator’s free will is destroyed 
and, as a result, the testator does something contrary to his ‘true’ desires.”14 Not all 
influence is undue.15 To be “undue” the influence must actually overcome the free agency 
of the testator.16 The influence must have “so impaired the volition of the donor as to 
substitute the volition of the donee or other person for the volition of the donor.”17 In 
contrast, “legitimate influence” such as “influence obtained by kindness and affection” is 
                                                
13 See, e.g., ATKINSON, supra note ___ at §54-61. 
14 In re Rotax’s Estate, 429 A. 2d 1304, 1305 (Vt. 1981). 
15  See In re Estate of Haneberg, 14 P. 3d 1088, 1096 (Kan. 2000). 
16 See In re Estate of Maheras, 897 P. 2d 268, 273-74 (Okla. 1995); WILL CONTESTS, 
supra note 12, at §7:2. 
17 LA. CIV. CODE art. 1479 (West 2013). 
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not undue.18 The line between acceptable influence and undue influence is frustratingly 
difficult to ascertain in some cases and has been criticized by a number of scholars. 
 
To succeed on an undue influence claim, most jurisdictions require the presence 
of four factors, namely: susceptibility, opportunity, disposition, and coveted result.19 
Susceptibility refers to “a person who is susceptible of being unduly influenced by the 
person charged with exercising undue influence.”20 The testator’s physical and mental 
conditions are relevant in determining his susceptibility to influence.21 Often, this means 
the testator had some diminished physical or mental capacity—yet he was not so 
diminished as to actually lack testamentary capacity. In practice, the line between undue 
influence and lack of capacity is not always clear. Facts giving rise to an undue influence 
claim will typically support a lack of capacity argument as well. As a result, both 
challenges are often brought together.22 Opportunity refers to “the opportunity of the 
person charged to exercise such influence on the susceptible person to procure the 
improper favor.”23 Disposition means “a disposition on the part of the party charged to 
influence unduly such susceptible person for the purpose of procuring an improper favor 
either for himself or another.”24 Finally, a coveted result is “a result caused by, or the 
                                                
18 See In re Estate of Haneberg, 14 P. 3d 1088, 1096 (Kan. 2000). 
19 See WILL CONTESTS, supra note 12, at §7:2. 
20 Estate of Christen, 239 N.W. 2d 528, 531 (Wis. 1976). 
21 WILL CONTESTS, supra note 12, at §7:3. 
22 See Sherman, supra note __, at 619-20. 
23 Estate of Christen, 239 N.W. 2d 528, 531 (Wis. 1976). 
24 Id. 
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effect of, such undue influence.”25 The failure of the testator to provide for “the natural 
objects of the testator’s bounty” is often evidence of a coveted result.26 
 
In evaluating these factors, courts also consider whether the testator and the 
alleged influencer had a confidential relationship.27 The existence of a confidential 
relationship makes a finding of undue influence more likely. Some jurisdictions require a 
confidential relationship as a threshold issue in all undue influence cases.28 In the 
jurisdictions that do not explicitly require a confidential relationship as threshold issue, 
findings of undue influence in the absence of a confidential relationship are unusual.29 
Regardless of the specific approach taken by any individual jurisdiction, the existence or 
non-existence of a confidential relationship is a critical determination in all undue 
influence cases.  
 
One of the more challenging aspects of undue influence cases is deciding which 
relationships constitute confidential relationships. Generally, a confidential relationship is 
a “relationship of inequality” meaning “a relationship in which the testator reposes an 
exceptional degree of reliance on the integrity and loyalty of another, either because of 
that other person’s knowledge or status or because of the testator’s dependence or 
subservience.”30 Most jurisdictions agree that traditional fiduciary relationships—like the 
                                                
25 Id. 
26 Sherman, supra note __, at 619. 
27 WILL CONTESTS, supra note __, at §7:4. 
28 See, e.g., In re Estate of Haneberg, 14 P. 3d 1088, 1096 (Kan. 2000); Estate of 
Gersbach, 960 P. 2d 811, 814 (N.M. 1998). 
29 WILL CONTESTS, supra note __, at §7:4. 
30 Sherman, supra note __, at 624. 
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attorney-client relationship or the relationship between the holder of a power of attorney 
and the grantor31—may give rise to a relationship of confidence.32 Some jurisdictions go 
so far as to call fiduciary relationships “confidential per se.”33 Confidential relationships, 
however, include more types of relationships than legally recognized fiduciary 
relationships. Whether a relationship constitutes a confidential relationship is a question 
of fact, generally requiring proof that the relationship was either (1) a reliant relationship 
or (2) a dominant-subservient relationship.34 A variety of relationships may form the 
basis of confidential relationships if those additional facts are present. Courts have found 
the following relationships, when coupled with evidence of a reliant or dominant-
subservient aspect, to be confidential relationships:  “a close confidential friendship,”35 “a 
clergyman-parishioner relationship,”36 a caregiver relationship37, and a banker-customer 
relationship.38  
 
2. Interested Parties  
 
The second doctrine aimed at ensuring freedom of testation prohibits an interested 
party serving as a witness to the will or assisting in its preparation.39  This rule “seeks to 
                                                
31 Medlock v. Mitchell, 234 S.W. 3d 901, 905 (Ark. App. 2006); Blissard v. White, 515 
So. 2d 1196, 1199-1200 (Miss. 1987). 
32 See WILL CONTESTS, supra note __, at §7:4; Sherman, supra note __, at 624. 
33 See, e.g.. Kelley v. Johns, 96 S.W. 3d 189, 197 (Ct. App. Tenn. 2002). 
34 See, e.g., Sherman, supra note __, at 624-25. 
35 Estate of Brevard, 213 S.W.3d 298, 304 (2007). 
36 Estate of Brevard, 213 S.W.3d 298, 304 (2007). 
37 Bean v. Wilson, 661 S.E. 2d 518, 519 (Ga. 2008). 
38 Owens v. Mazzei, 847 A. 2d 700 (Pa. Superior Ct. 2004) 
39 See, e.g., Triestman v. Kilgore, 838 S.W. 2d 547, 547 (Tex. 1992) (“A competent 
witness to a will is one who receives no pecuniary benefit under its terms.”) 
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insure that testators act free of influence from subscribing witnesses.”40 The existence of 
an interested witness or the involvement of an interested person in the preparation of a 
testament typically supports a finding of undue influence.41 Similarly, the involvement of 
interested parties tends to prove that the will was executed under suspicious 
circumstances. The scope and effect of the rule varies. A few states automatically void 
any bequest to a subscribing witness or notary.42 The more common approach, in 
contrast, allows the bequest to stand if there are additional disinterested witnesses.43 At 
least two states do not invalidate the bequest, but by statute provide that the existence of 
an interested witness creates a presumption of undue influence.44 Those states that do 
prohibit bequests to interested witnesses typically seek to strike a balance between 
testamentary freedom and family protection. To prevent a family member from being 
disinherited simply because he witnessed the will, many states will still allow the 
interested witness to receive an intestate or other share of property.45 Another issue of 
some variation is the scope of persons subject to the rule. Some states apply their rule to 
both interested witnesses and the spouses of interested parties by invalidating bequests to 
                                                
40 Estate of Tkachuck, 139 Cal. Rptr. 55, 58 (Ct. App. 1977). See also In re Johnson’s 
Estate, 347 So. 2d 785, 787 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1977) “An obvious purpose [of this rule], 
was to prevent fraud or undue influence by a witness to a will to thwart the intention of 
the testatrix.” Id. 
41 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §6112 
42 See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1582; R.I. GEN. LAWS §33-6-1; W. VA. CODE §41-2-1. 
43 See ARK. CODE §28-25-102 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. §45a-258 (2013); TEX. PROB. 
CODE §61-62 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. §30-2330 (2013); N. H. REV. STAT. §551:3 (2013); 
N. Y. ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW §3-3.2 (2013); S. C. CODE §62-2-504 (2013); 
TENN. CODE §32-1-103 (2013); WIS. STAT. §853.07 (2013); WYO. STAT. §2-6-112 (2013) 
44 See  CAL. PROB. CODE  §6112 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE §11.12.160 (2013) 
45 See ARK. CODE §28-25-102 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. §45A-258 (2013); LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 1582 (2013); MISS. STATS. §474.330 (2013), NEB. REV. STAT. §30-2330 (2013); 
N. Y. ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW §3-3.2 (2013); S.C. CODE §62-2-504 (2013); 
TENN. CODE §32-1-103 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE §11.12.160 (2013); W. VA. CODE §41-
2-1 (2013); WIS. STAT. §853.07 (2013); WYO. STAT. §2-6-112 (2013). 
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the spouse of a witness.46 In contrast, a number of states expressly allow bequests to 
charities with which a witness is associated.47 Some states also expressly allow a creditor 
to serve as a witness.48 
 
3. Attorney Ethics Rules.  
 
A number of attorney ethics rules are also aimed at preventing attorneys from 
negatively affecting a client’s exercise of his testamentary freedom. Model Rule 1.8(c) 
prevents attorneys from preparing wills in which they receive large gifts and from 
soliciting testamentary gifts from clients.  
 
A lawyer shall not solicit any substantial gift from a client, including a 
testamentary gift, or prepare on behalf of a client an instrument giving the lawyer or a 
person related to the lawyer any substantial gift unless the lawyer or other recipient of 
the gift is related to the client. For purposes of this paragraph, related persons include 
a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent or other relative or individual with 
whom the lawyer or the client maintains a close, familial relationship.49 
 
                                                
46 CONN. GEN. STAT. §45a-258 (2013); LA. CIV. Code art. 1582.1 (2013); N.H. REV. 
STAT. §551:3 (2013); S.C. CODE §62-2-504 (2013); W. VA. CODE §41-2-1 (2013); WIS. 
STAT. §853.07 (2013). 
47  See CONN. GEN. STAT. §45a-258 (2013). 
48 See R. I. GEN. LAWS §33-6-2 (2013); W. VA. CODE §41-2-2 (2013). 
49 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.8. 
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The rule imposes a duty on attorneys, for the benefit of their clients and the profession, to 
refrain from engaging in any conduct that could raise an inference of undue influence.50  
“An attorney must be as careful to avoid the appearance of evil as he is to avoid evil 
itself.”51 To that end, paragraph (k) of Rule 1.8 goes further and imputes the conflict to 
all other lawyers in the associated firm.52 In interpreting this rule, some states have 
suggested it also applies to serving as a witness to a will.53 
 
Paragraph (f) of Rule 1.8 is similarly aimed at protecting the client from undue 
influence. Rule 1.8(f) prohibits an attorney from accepting payment for his services from 
someone other than his client unless “(1) the client gives informed consent; (2) there is no 
interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the client-
lawyer relationship; and (3) information relating to representation of a client is protected 
as required by Rule 1.6.”54 In the estate-planning context, this rule is intended to prevent 
undue influence.55 When an attorney is paid by a client’s testamentary-heir, the court and 
the public might fairly question whether the attorney’s loyalty and independence have 
been affected.56 
 
                                                
50 See, e.g., Att’y Grievance Com’n of Maryland v. Lanocha, 896 A. 2d 996, 998 (Ct. 
App. Md. 2006); State v. Eisenberg, 138 N.W. 2d 235, 237 (Wis. 1965). 
51 State v. Gulbankian, 196 N.W. 2d 730, 732 (Wis. 1972). 
52 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.8. 
53 See, e.g., People v. Berge, 620 P. 2d 23, 27 (Colo. 1980) (en banc) 
54 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.8. Rule 1.6 addresses the duty of the 
attorney to maintain the client’s confidentiality. 
55 See Haynes v. First Nat. State Bank of New Jersey, 432 A. 2d 890, 889-90 (NJ 1981). 
56 See Haynes v. First Nat. State Bank of New Jersey, 432 A. 2d 890, 889-90 (NJ 1981); 
ABA Formal Op. 02-428. 
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B. Family Protection.  
 
The public policy supporting family protection also permeates the law of wills. The 
policy imposes a legal and moral duty on family members to support one another 
financially. Familial support obligations have ancient roots and essentially recognize that 
families form an economic unit.57 In the law of wills, several doctrines protect immediate 
family members from disinheritance by a testator.  
1. Spousal Share Statutes 
 
Perhaps the most significant family protection mechanism is the inability of a testator 
to fully disinherit his surviving spouse.58 With the exceptions of most59 of the community 
property jurisdictions (in which spousal protection is assured through the community 
property laws), and Georgia60, all states have elective share statutes that prevent the 
testator from fully disinheriting his surviving spouse.61 In most jurisdictions “[t]his 
probate doctrine allows a spouse to take a legislatively prescribed portion of the decedent 
                                                
57 See Andrew Simmonds, Amah and Eved and the Origin of Legal Rights, 46 S.D. L. 
REV. 516, 528 (2000-2001); John Whitte, Jr., The Goods and Goals of Marriage, 76 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019, 1020-28 (2001).  
58 See, e.g., Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn’t I Be Allowed to Leave My Property to 
Whomever I Choose (Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Loving the French), 
44 BRANDEIS L. J. 737, 781-82 (2006); Mark Glover, Formal Execution and Informal 
Revocation: Manifestations of Probate’s Family Protection Policy, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. 
REV. 411, 415-17 (2009). 
59 Louisiana, a community property state, also has an elective share statute. See LA. CIV. 
CODE  art. 2432.  
60 GA. CODE §53-4-1 provides “A testator, by will, may make any disposition of property 
that is not inconsistent with the laws or contrary to the public policy of the state and may 
give all the property to strangers, to the exclusion of the testator’s spouse and 
descendants.” 
61 See, e.g., Glover, supra note __, at 416-17; Kenneth Rampino, Comment, Spousal 
Disinheritance in Rhode Island: Barrett v. Barrett and the (De)Evolution of the Elective 
Share Law, 12 RODGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 420, 450 (2007). 
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spouse’s estate regardless of the terms of the will.”62 Spousal share statutes are based two 
theories of marriage: the “partnership theory” and the “support theory.”63 “The 
partnership theory of marriage recognizes that both partners have contributed to the 
accumulated estate” and should, therefore, share in its benefits.64 Like community 
property, the partnership theory of marriage recognizes that both spouses work together 
and should share in the “fruits of the marriage.”65 In contrast, “[t]he support theory 
recognizes that during their joint lives, spouses owe each other duties of support, and 
these duties continue in some force after death in favor of the survivor, as a claim on the 
decedent spouse’s estate.”66 If a testator fails to provide for his spouse by will, then the 
support theory provides the surviving spouse with a claim against his estate for financial 
support.67 The support theory seeks to prevent the surviving spouse “from becoming 
society’s ward by preventing impoverishment of the surviving spouse.”68 Approaches, of 
course, vary by state and may reflect one69 or both70 theories of marriage.  
                                                
62 Glover, supra note __, at 416. 
63 See e.g. In re Estate of Hjersted, 135 P. 3d 202, 207 (Kan. App. 2006) 
64 In re Antonopoulos, 993 P. 2d 637, 642 (Kan. 1999). Accord, In re Amundson, 621, 
N.W. 2d 882, 886 (S.D. 2001) 
65 In re Antonopoulos, 993 P. 2d 637, 642 (Kan. 1999).  
66 In re Antonopoulos, 993 P. 2d 637, 642 (Kan. 1999). Accord In re Estate of Shipman, 
832 N.W. 2d 335, 342-43 (S.D. 2013) 
67 Id. 
68 Williams v. Williams, 517 S.E. 2d 689, 691 (S.C. 1999). Accord Karsenty v. 
Schoukroun, 959 A. 2d 1147, 1167 (Md. Ct. App. 2008) (“…states responded by passing 
elective share statutes to protect widows from being disinherited and left with no 
reasonable means of financial support.”); In re Merkel’s Estate, 618 P.2d 872, 876 (Mont. 
1980)(“The primary purpose of the elective share statutes is to insure that the surviving 
spouse’s needs are met, and that the spouse is not left penniless.”). 
69 See e.g. In re Estate of Bilse, 746 A. 2d 1090, 1092 (N.J. Superior Ct. 1999)(holding 
that the New Jersey statute is need based); In re Estate of Shipman, 832 N.W. 2d 335, 
342-43 (S.D. 2013)(holding that South Dakota statute is intended to satisfy spousal 
support duty) 
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2. Homestead Statutes 
 
In addition to elective share statutes, a number of jurisdictions have homestead 
statutes or constitutional provisions that protect the economic interest of the surviving 
spouse and/or the children of the decedent. Broadly, there are two types of homestead 
statutes: family home statutes and fixed sum statutes. Family home statutes protect the 
interest of a surviving spouse and children in the family home.  “As a matter of public 
policy, the purpose of [these statutes] is to promote the stability and welfare of the state 
by securing to the householder a home, so that the homeowner and his or her heirs may 
live beyond the reach of financial misfortune and the demands of creditors…”71 The 
family home statutes, therefore, recognize the significant emotional and economic 
interests a decedent’s spouse and children have in the family home.72  A number of the 
family home-type homestead statutes allow the surviving spouse and/or minor children to 
remain in the family home even if the testator leaves the home to some other person.73 
The property rights conferred by this right, and their duration, vary by state.74 Homestead 
statutes further protect the surviving spouse and children by exempting the family home 
from seizure and sale by creditors.75  
The fixed sum-type homestead statutes, in contrast, give the surviving spouse and 
dependent children a claim to a fixed sum of money from the decedent’s estate rather 
                                                                                                                                            
70 See e.g. In re Amundson, 621 N.W. 2d 882, 886 (S.D. 2001) (“Two rationales underlie 
our elective share system: support and contribution.”) 
71 Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. 1988) 
72 In re Estate of Bonde, 694 N.W. 2d 74, 77 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) 
73 See e.g. MINN. STAT. §524.2-402; N.D. CENTURY CODE §30-16-02; 58 OKL. STAT. 
§311; TEX. ESTATES CODE §102.005. See also, Snyder v. Davis, 699 So. 2d 999, 1001-02 
(Fla. 1997). 
74 See id. 
75 See e.g. MINN. STAT. §524.2-402(c); Snyder v. Davis, 699 So. 2d 999, 1001-02 (Fla. 
1997); Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. 1988) 
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than rights to real estate.76 The sum of money is ordinarily fixed by statute and is quite 
modest.77 The policy considerations behind the fixed sum statutes are similar to the 
family home statutes.78 To that end, the sum of money that the surviving spouse and 
children receive under the applicable homestead statute is usually exempt from the claims 
of the decedent’s creditors.79 
3. Family Allowance Statutes 
 
Family allowance statutes offer the testator’s surviving spouse and minor children 
some additional protections. These statutes generally give the surviving spouse and minor 
children the right to receive a time-limited allowance for their support during the 
administration of the testator’s estate.80 “[T]he family allowance [is] a statutory creation 
designed to provide sustenance for the family during the settlement of the estate…”81 
Most family allowance statutes limit the time period of the support to one year.82 Unlike 
other family protection mechanisms, family allowances typically fall within the 
discretion of the courts.83 In determining whether a spouse or child is entitled to an 
allowance, courts consider a variety of factors to determine need, including: age, health, 
previous standard of living, value of the estate, and the value of other resources available 
                                                
76 See e.g. MONT. CODE §72-2-412 ($20,000) 
77 See e.g. ALA. CODE §43-8-110 ($6,000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §14-2402 ($18,000); IDAHO 
CODE §15-2-402 ($50,000); MONT. CODE §72-2-412 ($20,000); MISSOURI STAT. §474.290 
($15,000) 
78 See Carter v. Coxwell, 479 So. 2d 1181, 1183 (Ala. 1985) 
79 See note __, supra. 
80 See e.g. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §14-2404; CAL. PROB. CODE §6540; MICH. COMP. L. 
§700.2403; MISSOURI STAT. §474.260; MONT. CODE §72-2-414; 18 MAINE REV. STAT. §2-
403;  MASS. GEN. L. 190B §2-404; UTAH CODE §75-2-404 
81 In re Estate of Seymour, 671 N.W. 2d 109, 113 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003). Accord Parson 
v. Parson, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 686, 687 (Ct. App. 1996) 
82 See note __, supra. 
83 See note __, supra. See also Estate of Hamilton, 869 P. 2d 971, 978 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994); Estate of Butler, 607 P. 2d 956, 959 (Ariz. 1980) 
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to the claimant.84 If a court does decide to award a family allowance, the payment is 
typically made in priority to other debts.85 
4. Undue Influence as Family Protection 
 
Courts sometimes use the doctrine of undue influence to invalidate testaments that 
fail to provide for the testator’s immediate family. Thus, undue influence operates to 
ensure freedom of testation and, in some instances, family protection. Professor Melanie 
Leslie examined a number of undue influence cases and observed: 
 
Although the opinions studied habitually recited that a court’s sole purpose is to 
effectuate the testator’s true intentions, a closer inspection reveals that a significant 
number of courts employed a governing rule less concerned with divining 
testamentary intent than with determining whether the reason behind the disposition 
was justifiable in the court’s view. Courts were much more likely to honor 
testamentary intent when the will provided for family members as opposed to non-
relatives.86 
 
Several aspects of the undue influence doctrine facilitate courts in protecting the 
testator’s family. If a court invalidates a testament on undue influence grounds, then the 
decedent’s property will generally pass under the laws of intestacy—which will benefit 
                                                
84 Estate of Hamilton, 869 P. 2d 971, 978 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); MISSOURI STAT. 
§474.260 
85 See Parson v. Parson, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 686, 687 (Ct. App. 1996) 
86 Leslie, supra note ____, at 243-44.  
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his surviving spouse and immediate relatives.87 Two important aspects of the undue 
influence doctrine are easily seen as family protection mechanisms: the confidential 
relationship requirement and the coveted result/unnatural bequest requirement.  
 
The existence of a confidential relationship between the testator and the influencer is 
a threshold issue in most undue influence cases.88 Family members benefit from this 
requirement because courts are hesitant to find family members in a confidential 
relationship with each other—thus, it is less likely for a testament to be invalidated due to 
the influence of a close relative. Courts struggle to fit family relationships into the 
confidential relationship framework—particularly spousal relationships and parent-child 
relationships. In practice, “[c]ourts are reluctant to find a confidential relationship among 
spouses and blood relatives.”89  “The failure to find a confidential relationship in the 
context of the family is not because family relationships lack the characteristics of 
dependence and reliance—indeed it is these very characteristics that are the hallmark of 
the family relationship.”90 The analysis is often complicated when children or spouses 
stand in positions that courts often view as confidential relationships—in particular, 
caregivers and power of attorney holders.91 In the spousal context, courts take a variety of 
approaches. At least one court explicitly held that the “relationship between a husband 
and wife is a confidential relationship.”92 Other courts recognize that result is harsh in 
light the evidentiary function of the existence of a confidential relationship. Thus, some 
                                                
87 See Madoff, supra note ______ at 611. 
88 See Part ____, infra. 
89 See Madoff, supra note ______ at 602. 
90 See Madoff, supra note ______ at 603. 
91 See Part ____, infra. 
92 Medlock v. Mitchell, 234 S.W. 3d 901, 905 (Ark. App. 2006). 
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courts specifically hold that the spousal relationship, although confidential in nature, does 
not necessarily carry the same evidentiary presumptions as other confidential 
relationships.93 As one court explained: “Although it has been said that a proper 
relationship between a husband and wife is often a ‘fiduciary’ or ‘confidential’ 
relationship, something beyond this normal spousal relationship must exist before a 
‘fiduciary’ or ‘confidential’ relationship can be found for the purposes of a claim of 
undue influence.”94 Courts are reluctant to find a confidential relationship even where 
one spouse is acting as the caregiver for the other spouse, managing his financial affairs, 
or involved in the preparation of his testament—all facts which would ordinarily support 
a finding of undue influence.95  Parent-child relationships are equally challenging. Courts 
are similarly reluctant to find that these relationships are confidential relationships,96 even 
                                                
93 See Estate of Langston v. Williams, 57 So. 3d 618, 622 (Miss. 2011). Accord Jacobs v. 
Vaillancourt, 634 So. 2d 667, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (“The confidential 
relaptionship which exists between a husband and wife is not one which may be 
considered in the law governing will contests.”); Keasler v. Estate of Keasler, 973 S.E. 2d 
213, 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (“[T]he mere fact that one spouse exerices great 
influence over the affairs of life as well as home and domestic concerns is insufficient to 
raise a presumption of invalidity of the will.”). 
94 Ruestman v. Ruestman, 111 S.W. 3d 464, 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). Accord, Estate of 
Baumgarten, 363 Ill. Dec. 625, 631 (App. Ct. 2012) (“[T]he law does not and should not 
presume…undue influence…because the spouse has been able throughout the marriage to 
have considerable influence on her spouse.”). 
95 See, e.g., Ruestman v. Ruestman, 111 S.W. 3d 464, 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (finding 
no evidence of a confidential relationship between decedent and his wife despite wife 
serving as decedent’s primary caretaker); Estate of Mowdy, 973 P. 2d 345, 349 (Okla. Ct. 
App. 1998) (finding no undue influence on part of wife who was previously decedent’s 
legal secretary where white personally typed decedent’s will). 
96 See, e.g., Pyle v. Sayers, 34 S.W. 3d 786, 789 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000) (“The influence of 
children over parents is legitimate so long as they do not extend a positive dictation and 
control over the mind of the testator.”); Bills v. Lindsay, 909 S.W. 2d 434, 440 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1993) (“A normal relationship between a mentally competent parent and an adult 
child is not per se a confidential relationship and it raises no presumption of invalidity of 
the transaction.”). 
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where a child is serving in a relationship that is ordinarily classified as a confidential or 
fiduciary relationship.97  
 
The coveted result/unnatural bequest aspect of the undue influence analysis also tends 
to serve a family protection function because it often makes it easier for family members 
to prove a case of undue influence perpetrated by a non-relative. Courts presume that 
testators will normally leave their property to their spouse and close blood relatives.98 
This viewpoint makes it easier for a testator’s family to establish an undue influence case 
whenever a testator omits family in favor of a third party. Some courts essentially require 
a finding of some “unnatural” disposition in order to establish an undue influence claim.99 
“The establishment of the fact that the testament executed would not have been executed 
but for such influence is generally predicated upon a consideration of whether the 
                                                
97 See, e.g., Eddleman v. Estate of Farmer, 740 S.W.2d 141, 140-43 (Ark. 1987) (finding 
no undue influence on part of daughter/caretaker of decedent who left his estate to her 
and no property to his other daughter); Jacobs v. Vaillancourt, 634 So. 2d 667, 671 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (finding no undue influence on son-in-law who prepared will for 
testator which substantially benefitted testator’s daughter and son-in-law’s wife); Carter 
v. Carter, 526 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988) (describing sons’ role in helping 
mother execute a will “the acts of dutiful sons who helped their mother draw up her will 
and execute it” rather than “active procurement”); Estate of McCorkle v. Beason, 27 
So.3d 1180, 1186 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)(finding no undue influence or confidential 
relationship between daughter and testator even though daughter held power of attorney 
for father, shared a bank account and safe deposit box with father, discussed will with 
father and then typed it for him);  Estate of Angle, 777 A. 2d 114, 123 (Pa. Superior Ct. 
2001)(“A parent-child relationship does not establish the existence of a confidential 
relationship nor does the fact that the proponent has a power of attorney where the 
decedent wanted the proponent to act as attorney-in-fact.”); Estate of Jakiella, 510 A. 2d 
815, 817 (Pa. Superior Ct. 1986)(holding that neither parent-child relationship nor child’s 
appointment of attorney-in-fact for mother required a finding of a confidential 
relationship). 
98 See Leslie, supra note ___ at 245-46. 
99 See, e.g., Baxter v. Grasso, 740 N.E. 2d 1048, 1051 (Mass. Ct. App. 2001)(“It is settled 
law that to constitute undue influence, four factors must be satisfied: (1) an unnatural 
disposition has been made….)(internal quotations omitted).  
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testament executed is unnatural in its terms of disposition of property.”100 In jurisdictions 
where a finding of suspicious circumstances is required to support a claim of undue 
influence, courts typically consider unnatural dispositions as evidence of suspicious 
circumstances.101 Still, other courts consider an unnatural disposition as one of several 
factors that can support an undue influence claim.102 The naturalness of a disposition is 
typically established if the testator, for no apparent reason, left his property to someone 
other than the natural objects of his bounty.103 The testator’s spouse and intestate heirs 
are, generally, the persons deemed to be the natural objects of his bounty.104 Regardless 
of the stated evidentiary significance in a particular jurisdiction, unnatural dispositions 
are often dispositive in undue influence cases. In the course of her study, Professor Leslie 
observed that “many of the opinions dealing with contested gifts to non-relatives 
concentrated….on whether, in the court’s opinion the gift to a non-relative was 
justifiable.”105 She further observed that, “a significant number of courts confronted with 
wills that disinherited family members in favor of non-family members upheld or 
imposed findings of undue influence based on minimal evidence, or evidence that would 
                                                
100 Estate of Johnson, 340 S.W. 3d 769, 783 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011). Accord Ruestman v. 
Ruestman, 111 S.W. 3d 464, 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003)(“An important consideration in 
determining whether undue influence has occurred is whether the disposition of the 
property was ‘unnatural’.”). Accord Rostanzo v. Rostanzo, 900 N.E. 2d 101, 114 (Mass. 
Ct. App. 2009)(noting that one of the facts supporting an undue influence claim is an 
unnatural disposition). 
101 See, e.g., Slusarenko v. Slusarenk, 147 P. 3d 920, 931 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (“The 
following factors may constitute suspicious circumstances…(6) an unnatural or unfair 
disposition of property.”). 
102 See Estate of Graham, 69 S.W. 3d 589, 610 (Tax. Ct. App. 2001). 
103 See Ruestman v. Ruestman, 111 S.W. 3d 464, 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). 
104 See Ruestman v. Ruestman, 111 S.W. 3d 464, 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). 
105 Leslie, supra note ___, at 246. 
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be insufficient to meet the contestant’s burden of proof in a case where the will’s primary 
beneficiaries were non-relatives.”106 
 
C. Charitable Giving 
 
The law of wills also furthers the more general public policy favoring charitable 
giving.  
 
1. Identification of Beneficiaries 
 
Generally, a testament must identify the testator’s beneficiaries with reasonable 
certainty.107 The testator does not have to use any particular language, however, the 
“beneficiary must be capable of identification.”108 “If the writing is so uncertain or 
confused or ambiguous that the testator’s intentions cannot be reasonably ascertained, it 
is void as a testamentary instrument.”109 This rule is often relaxed in the case of 
charitable bequests. Because gifts to charity are favored, “a charitable disposition in a 
will must be liberally construed to uphold its validity.”110 Both statutes111 and 
jurisprudence recognize “the validity of charitable bequests that do not specify the 
charity, or even the general charitable purpose.”112  If the testator sufficiently expresses 
                                                
106 Leslie, supra note ___, at 245. 
107 See e.g. Johnson v. Johnson, 229 S.W. 2d 743, 775 (Ky. Ct. App.  1950)(“The law 
permits one to dispose of his property by will, but the intention of the testator must be 
expressed with sufficient clarity to enable a court to enforce its provisions.”). 
108 Smoot v. McCandless, 461 S.W. 2d 776, 781 (Missouri 1970) 
109 Johnson v. Johnson, 229 S.W. 2d 743, 775 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950). Accord Holcomb v. 
Newton, 226 S.W. 2d 670 (Tex. Ct. App. 1950); Uloth v. Little, 73 N.E. 2d 459 (Mass. 
Sup. Ct. 1947) 
110 Estate of Clementi, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 685, 692 (Ct. App. 2008). Accord 
111 See e.g. CONN. GEN. STAT. §45a-515; Ga. CODE §53-4-62; LA. CIV. CODE art. 1572 
112 Estate of Clementi, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 685, 692 (Ct. App. 2008). Accord Staab’s Estate, 
173 N.W. 2d 866, 871 (Iowa 1970) (“Courts generally subscribe to the view that 
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his desire that his property be used for charitable purposes, then the bequest will stand 
and the executor or trustee may select the particular charities that will receive property.113 
 
 
2. Capacity to Inherit; Lapse 
 
Courts often refuse to apply the doctrine of lapse to charitable bequests, which 
further advances the public policy favoring charitable bequests. A legacy to legatee that 
dies or ceases to exist prior to the date of the decedent’s death will lapse.114 When a 
legacy lapses it may pass to another legatee under the express terms of the will, to 
another person under an anti-lapse statute, or to the decedent’s heirs in intestacy.115 
Charitable organizations do not “die” per se, but they do sometimes cease existence. An 
existing organization may merge with another organization, may cease operations, or 
may fully dissolve prior to the death of the testator.116 
When a charitable organization named in a will no longer exists on the date of a 
decedent’s death then the doctrine of lapse should apply.117 In practice, however, courts 
feel “obliged to ensure that the testator’s charitable intent is enforced” notwithstanding 
                                                                                                                                            
charitable bequests shall not be permitted to fail or lapse for lack of definiteness as to the 
purpose of the bequest.”); Marshal v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 202 S.E. 2d 94, 97 (Ga. 1973) 
113 Id. 
114 See e.g. Niemann v. Zacharias, 176 N.W. 2d 671, 673-74 (Neb. 1970); Estate of 
Micheel, 577 N.W. 2d 407, 409 (Iowa 1998); Estate of Haugen, 794 N.W. 2d 448, 450-
51 (N.D. 2011) 
115 See e.g. Estate of Haugen, 794 N.W. 2d 448, 451 (N.D. 2011); Estate of Harper, 975 
A.2d 1155, 1159 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2009); Estate of Hanna, 919 So. 2d 104, 106 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2005) 
116  See e.g. Gustafson v. Wesley Foundation, 469 S.E. 2d 160, 162 (Ga. 1996) (charitable 
organization transferred all of its assets to another organization); Crisp Area YMCA v. 
Nations Bank, N.A., 526 S.E. 2d 63, 66 (Ga. 2000) (charitable organization that was 
inactive on the date of decedent’s death allowed to inherit). 
117 E.g. In re Brunzel, 51 N.Y. S. 2d 483, 484 (Surr. Ct. 1944); In re Flathers, 288 P. 231, 
232 (Wash. 1930) 
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the non-existence of the charitable beneficiary.118 If the charitable organization no longer 
exists and has no successor organization, courts may invoke the doctrine of cy pres and 
distribute the legacy to other charitable organizations with similar purposes.119  
3. Conditions 
 
Courts sometimes relieve charitable bequests from the rules governing failure of a 
condition. When a testator makes a bequest subject to a condition, the courts will 
generally enforce the condition as written. If the condition fails, is not satisfied, or is 
impossible the bequest should lapse.120 In the charitable context, however, courts are 
more lenient. When a testator gives property to a charity and directs its use for a 
particular purpose, courts will often ignore the condition or construe the condition to be 
merely precatory in nature.121 In In re Fairchild, for example, the testator made the 
following bequest:  
I give a one-fiftieth part to each of the seven following named persons and 
corporations, absolutely, provided, in each case, that she or it survive me: ...(2) 
Hopewell Society, having its place of business at Number 218 Gates Avenue, 
Brooklyn, New York (the said fund to be used for the benefit of the Gould Guest 
House now situated at Number 27 Monroe Street, Brooklyn, New York).122 
                                                
118 Gustafson v. Wesley Foundation, 469 S.E. 2d 160, 162 (Ga. 1996). 
119 See e.g. Rhode Island Assoc. for Blind v. Nugent, 206 A. 2d 527, 530-31 (R.I. 1965); 
Leventhal’s Estate, 212 N.Y. S. 2d 475, 476-77 (Surr. Ct. 1961) 
120 See e.g. Hirschberg’s Estate, 112 N.Y. S. 2d 919, 920-21 (1952); Bank One Trust Co. 
v. Resident Home Ass’n for Mentally Retarded, 2003 WL 21674987 (Ct. App. Ohio 
2003)(slip copy) 
121 See e.g. U.S. Nat. Bank of Oregon v. Rhilander, 677 P. 2d 745, 745 (Org. Ct. App. 
1984); In re Fairchild, 178 N.Y. S. 2d 886, 888-89 (Surr. Ct. 1958). 
122 In re Fairchild, 178 N.Y. S. 2d 886, 889(Surr. Ct. 1958). 
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Several legatees argued that the legacy lapsed because the Gould Guest House no longer 
existed and, therefore, the condition could not be fulfilled.123 The court, however, 
reasoned that “[t]he parenthetical words following the absolute legacy are apparently 
indicative of the testator’s desire that so long as the Society conducted Gould Guest 
House the fund was to be used for that purpose.124 Because the Gould Guest House no 
longer existed, the legatee was “free to use the fund in any manner within its general 
charitable functions.”125  Similarly, in Rubel v. Friend, the testator made a charitable 
bequest in trust and directed that the trustees use his residuary estate to establish and 
maintain a convalescent home within ten years of his death.126 The trustees failed to 
comply with the terms of the testament within the ten-year time frame.127 The court 
determined that the failure of the trustees to meet the condition did not cause the bequest 
to lapse because “[e]quity considers the general charitable purpose of the testator or 
donor as the substance of the devise or gift.”128 A charitable bequest, in the view of the 
court, “will not be permitted to lapse or be defeated by the mere expiration of time or 
because there cannot be a literal compliance with its provision.”129 Statutes in a number 
of jurisdictions now expressly give courts the authority to distribute property in 
accordance with the testator’s general charitable intent while striking problematic 
conditions.130 
 
                                                
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 888 
126 101 N.E. 2d 445, 452 (Ill. App. Ct. 1951) 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 448. 
129 Id. at 449. 
130 See e.g. DEL. CODE §12:3541; KAN. STAT. §59-22a01; PA. CON. STAT. §20:7740.3;  
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III. EVOLUTION OF CHARITABLE BEQUESTS AND COMPETING PUBLIC 
POLICIES 
 
Throughout history, the law of wills has attempted to strike the appropriate balance 
between testamentary freedom and family protection. As soon as the law allowed 
charitable bequests, that balance was affected. The church—at one time the only sizeable 
charitable organization—repeatedly inserted itself in the dying process and the process of 
preparing and administering wills. Each time this occurred, the church benefitted 
financially at the expense of testamentary freedom, family protection, and the public 
image of the church. For centuries, societies have struggled to find the appropriate 
balance and have periodically checked the power of the church in the dying and will-
making process. Today, however, the problem is not limited to religious organizations. 
Both religious and secular charities are aggressively seeking involvement in the 
testamentary process in hopes of financial benefit. History shows us the need for 
legislative and judicial response. 
A. Evolution of the Competing Policies in Late Antiquity through the Middle Ages 
 
The challenging public policy questions raised by encouraging testamentary 
bequests to charity can be traced back to late antiquity. As the U.S. Supreme Court 
succinctly explained: 
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Charities had their origin in the great command to love they neighbor as thyself. 
But when the Emperor Constantine permitted his subjects to bequeath their 
property to the church, it was soon abused; so much so, that afterwards, when it 
became too common to give land to religious uses, consistently with the free 
circulation of property, the supreme authority of every nation in Europe, where 
Christianity prevailed, found it necessary to limit such devises by statutes of 
mortmain.131 
 
The Court’s summation, of course, oversimplifies matters. Inheritance laws are an 
ancient concept. Default schemes of intestacy are found, among other sources, in the 
Code of Hammurabi,132 biblical texts,133 and the Aztec society.134 However, the testament 
as we think of it today—an instrument allowing a person to direct the distribution of his 
property as he sees fit—appears to be a creation of Roman law.135 Under the law of the 
Twelve Tables, Roman citizens enjoyed full testamentary freedom in the sense that they 
could dispose of the entirety of their estates at death.136 Prior to the Twelve Tables, 
property passed from one male to the “next of kin in the male line.”137 The law set forth 
                                                
131 Perin v. Casey, 65 U.S. 465, 498 (1860). 
132 See Robert C. Ellickson & Charles Dia Thorland, Ancient Land Law: Mesopotamia, 
Egypt, Israel, 71 CHI. KENT L. REV. 321, 366-67 (1995). 
133 See generally, Calum Carmichael, Inheritance in Biblical Sources, 20 L. & 
LITERATURE 229 (2008). 
134 See Francisco Avalos, An Overview of the Legal System of the Aztec Empire, 86 L. 
LIBRARY J. 259 (1994). 
135 See EUNICE L. ROSS & THOMAS J. REED, WILL CONTESTS §2:1 (2nd ed.) [Hereinafter 
WILL CONTESTS]. 
136 See JOHN GEORGE PHILLIMORE, PRIVATE LAW AMONG THE ROMANS FROM THE 
PANDECTS 352 (1863) [Hereinafter PRIVATE LAW AMONG THE ROMANS]. 
137 JOHN GEORGE PHILLIMORE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY AND HISTORY OF THE 
ROMAN LAW 120-121 (1848) [Hereinafter STUDY AND HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW]. 
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in the Twelve Tables allowed greater freedom, but it still attempted to strike a balance 
between freedom of testation and rules of public order: 
  
The absolute power of bequest, conferred on every citizen by the Twelve Tables, 
was a concession to the people. The transfer of property by will at this time being 
an event which, in a small state, might materially affect the well being of the 
community, was an act of legislation to which publicity was required.138 
 
Roman law was highly formalistic. “The Roman law sought to ascertain, fix and 
determine the true declaration of the last will of a testator, by surrounding that declaration 
by such safeguards as to forbid the possibility of fraud or the perversion of the testator’s 
intention in the solemn act of testamentation.”139 To that end, Roman testaments required 
a certain number of competent witnesses—none of whom could be named as an heir or 
related to an heir named in the testament.140 In addition to requiring publicity and other 
form requirements, the law restricted the persons a testator could name as an heir or 
legatee. Importantly, for our purposes, Roman law required that the testator name a 
definite and identifiable heir who was a natural person.141 Corporations, societies and 
other juridical persons could not be named as heirs or legatees.142 Nor could the testator 
                                                
138 Id. 
139 MOSES A. DROPSIE, ROMAN LAW OF TESTAMENTS, CODICILS, AND GIFTS IN THE EVENT 
OF DEATH, 2 (1892). 
140 See DROPSIE, supra note __, at 80-81. 
141 See DROPSIE, supra note __, at 49. 
142 See DROPSIE, supra note __, at 49; PRIVATE LAW AMONG THE ROMANS, supra note __, 
at 343-44. 
 30 
leave his property to “the poor” of for other general pious or charitable causes.143 Policy 
concerns eventually resulted in additional restrictions on testamentary freedom that 
served a family protection function. For example, testators could only disinherit certain 
heirs—“necessarius haeres”—if there was a valid legal cause for disinherison.144  
 
The spread of Christianity forever changed the law. In 313 A.D., Constantine’s 
Edict of Milan specifically recognized the right of the church to own property as a 
corporation.145 A few years later, Constantine gave Roman citizens the right to leave their 
estates to “any of the most sacred and venerable Catholic churches”146 rather than to their 
own families. Very few other juridical persons or indefinite heirs could receive 
testamentary bequests of property. This practice was soon abused and corrupted.147 
Romans would leave all of their property to the church, to the detriment of their children, 
other relatives, and creditors.148 The church became an incredibly powerful influence in 
the dying process.149 This is not particularly surprising. Fear of death and the desire for 
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immortality are universal human characteristics150 and the church offered the promise of 
immortality for believers.151  
 
Following the fall of the Western Roman Empire and the resulting political power 
vacuum, the church assumed and even greater role in the testamentary process.152 
Testamentary bequests to the church became compulsory rather than simply permitted. 
The church combined the final confession with the act of directing the distribution of 
property at death.153 In the West, the church established its own form for executing a 
testament in accordance with Canon law.154 These testaments had to be executed in the 
presence of a priest or other religious official—but were otherwise lacking many of the 
formalities required by Roman law.155 The church worked to abolish many aspects of the 
Roman law aimed at protecting the freedom of the testator—such as the requirement of 
disinterested witnesses—in order to enhance the likelihood that the church would benefit 
from a will.156 “[M]any councils in France, England, and Spain made it a law for the 
laity, that they should not testamentate otherwise than in the presence of their priests.”157 
The last testament and the last confession were both part of the same act and that act 
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required the presence of a priest.158 Thus, the members of the clergy were the only people 
capable of receiving testaments in the first place.159 Naturally, these testaments, often 
delivered orally, contained significant bequests to the church. The church, therefore, 
offered salvation and immortality, but at a literal monetary price.160 “One needs to go but 
little way into the documentary history of the period from the fifth to the fifteenth 
centuries of our era, to find abundant examples of the way in which men bought their 
peace with Heaven…”161  
 
In 597, Pope Gregory I sent Augustus to England to help spread Christianity.162 
Soon, “the clergy had obtained enormous power, and in a great measure controlled the 
government, which, from their education and knowledge, they were peculiarly qualified 
to administer.”163 The Roman clergy were often the only men qualified to act as lawyers 
“and they exercised the profession of religion and law for centuries before these 
vocations were severed and performed by different classes of persons.”164 The church 
took control of the probate system as well as the execution of testaments.165 Testators 
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needed the help of a priest to execute testaments. The church, in turn, was responsible for 
interpreting and enforcing the terms of those testaments.166  
 
Feudalism and primogeniture resulted in a division of inheritance systems in 
England. Land transferred to the oldest son by operation of law and the church had only a 
limited ability to obtain land by testamentary bequest.167 The church, however, controlled 
the system governing the transfer of chattels at death. Initially, the church asserted 
jurisdiction over wills that left chattels for religious or pious uses.168 Because testators 
customarily left a third of their chattels to the church, the church essentially asserted 
jurisdiction over all testate estates.169  The church eventually “asserted a right to oversee 
the goods of men who died without wills” as well.170 If a man died intestate, then, in the 
view of the church he also died without his last confession.171 When this occurred, it fell 
to the church to use the chattels of the deceased to do what it could to help his soul.172 By 
the thirteenth century, ecclesiastical courts held exclusive jurisdiction over probate and 
similar matters.173  
 
Testaments proved to be a lucrative business for the clergy from the fall of the 
Western Roman Empire through at least the sixteenth century.174 The clergy “introduced 
                                                
166 See id. 
167 See id. at 2-5. 
168 See, e.g., Findley, supra note __, at 1149.   
169 See, e.g., id. 
170 Id. at 1150.   
171 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note __, at 357. 
172 Id. 
173 See, e.g., Findley, supra note __, at 1150. 
174 DROPSIE, supra note __, at 5. 
 34 
the mode of disposing estates after death by testament, and as they were the only persons 
capable of drafting such instruments, and as they had the care of the souls of the 
testators…generous provisions were made for the church, which became greatly 
enriched.”175  Conflict was inevitable. 
 
B. Competing Policies in England 
 
The church acquired massive land holdings in England.176 Although primogeniture 
made it difficult for the church to receive land in a testamentary bequest, feudalism 
actually provided the church with an even better opportunity to add to its real estate 
holdings. “It seems that whenever possible poor freemen preferred to grant their land to 
the monasteries for protection rather than to the rich landowners.”177 The church offered 
more agreeable terms then other feudal lords.178 “[T]he terms of service exacted of a 
vassal by the church were less burdensome and…the monks not only promised him 
protection but also assured him that they would intercede for his happiness after 
death.”179 The other feudal lords were unhappy with this arrangement. In their view, 
excessive property ownership by corporations (and churches in particular) was inherently 
problematic because it removed property from the stream of commerce.180 The feudal 
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aristocracy worried that inter vivos donations of property to juridical persons allowed 
people to avoid their feudal services to the detriment of the feudal lords and the nation as 
a whole.181 In response, England enacted a series of “mortmain” (literally “dead hand”) 
statutes beginning with the Magna Charta in 1215 in an effort to recalibrate the 
competing policy concerns.182 The Magna Charta provided that “no land would thereafter 
be alienated except so as to retain the services due to the lord of the fees.”183 Those 
restrictions soon proved insufficient and a new statute—the Great Charter of 1217—was 
enacted.184 That act was broader in scope than the Magna Charta and provided a 
procedural mechanism for enforcement.185 The 1217 act also proved somewhat 
ineffective and was followed by the 1279 Statute of Mortmain, which attempted to 
expand the scope of the prohibition.186  
 
Initially, family protection was not a major concern because existing laws and 
customs protected the family.187 A man’s land devolved to the eldest son by operation of 
law under primogeniture, with a life interest, or dower, over a portion of those lands 
going to his widow.188 Wills dealt with a testator’s chattels, but often just confirmed the 
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default tripartite rule of chattel division.189 If a man had both children and a wife then he 
could only dispose of one-third of his chattels by testament.190 The remaining two-thirds 
formed the “reserve” or “legitime” belonging to the widow and children. The surviving 
widow received one-third, and the remaining one-third was divided between the testator’s 
children.191 These rules varied somewhat by region and over time—but their general 
thrust remained the same.192 The testator’s wife and children were entitled to a reserve or 
legitime that was some fraction of the testator’s estate.193 The testator could direct the 
remaining disposable portion of his estate to someone other than his wife and children.194 
In practice, however, that disposable portion went to the church either by custom or 
ecclesiastical law.195 Testamentary freedom became virtually extinct.196   
 
The early mortmain statutes were simply not aimed at protecting the testator’s 
family.197 Rather, the early mortmain statutes sought to strike the proper balance between 
the power of the church and the interest of society as a whole.198 The power struggle 
between the church and the aristocracy continued over the years.199 In response to the 
1279 Statute of Mortmain, the ecclesiastical courts adopted the civil law concept of 
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“uses” which essentially allowed the church to obtain the enjoyment of even more land 
and to circumvent the mortmain statutes.200  In the 1500’s, King Henry VIII actively used 
the powers granted to him under the various mortmain statutes to usurp the power of the 
Catholic church and its landholdings in England.201 Parliament enacted the Statute of 
Uses, which invalidated the concept of uses that the church had used to its advantage in 
earlier years.202 Yet, the reign of King Henry VIII and the Reformation actually coincided 
with a change in public attitude regarding charitable giving—particularly secular 
giving.203 “Several legislative enactments during this time encouraged private 
philanthropy, especially in the areas of education and the relief of the poor, sick, and 
aged.”204 These two developments were not necessarily inconsistent. The religious houses 
had, to some extent, served the poor and needy prior to the Reformation.205 By 
encouraging private—but not necessarily religious—philanthropy, the state sought “to 
prevent the poor, the aged, and others from becoming a burden on the state.”206 Queen 
Elizabeth I continued this trend during her reign.207 The English legal system showed an 
increasingly favorable attitude towards charitable secular giving in the following years 
and the early mortmain statutes were eventually weakened and repealed.208 Legislation 
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enacted in 1703 essentially repealed any remaining mortmain statutes and created a new 
and powerful charitable corporation called “Queen Anne’s Bounty.”209 Queen Anne’s 
Bounty had a decidedly religious purpose. The queen, who pressured parliament to enact 
the legislation, sought to rebuild and strengthen the church in the wake of the 
Reformation.210 To that end, Queen Anne’s Bounty earmarked certain tax revenue to be 
used to support the clergy of the Church of England.211 
England generally moved towards a system allowing greater testamentary 
freedom.212 Fraud, however, soon posed a serious threat to that freedom. Prior to 
enactment of the Statute of Frauds of 1677, testaments conveying real property only 
needed to be written.213 The signature of the testator or witness was not required.214 
Testaments conveying only personal property could be oral.215  When the Fire of London 
in 1666 destroyed the real estate records and the plague caused an inordinate number of 
deaths, this legislative scheme proved disastrous.216 Real estate fraud was rampant.217 
Without the signature of the testator or disinterested witnesses, it was virtually impossible 
to determine whether a purported testament was the actual will of the testator.218 The 
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Statute of Frauds of 1677 largely remedied this problem.219 Under the new law, 
testaments conveying real property had to be in writing, signed by the testator, and 
attested to before several disinterested witnesses.220 Testaments conveying only personal 
property were subject to a less onerous form, but generally required a written 
instrument.221   
While charitable giving and testamentary freedom gained popular and legal support, 
family protection measures lost some ground.222 By the 1700’s England had abandoned 
the laws and customs reserving a portion of the testator’s property for his wife and 
children.223  It is not entirely clear why England abolished these family protection 
mechanisms.224 Certainly, women and children remained dependent on their husbands 
and fathers for support and protection. The major continental legal systems all retained 
some portion of a testator’s estate for his wife and children—making the English 
abandonment of that approach even more unusual.225 
 
The popularity of the church and clergy eventually waned again and England decided 
to recalibrate the competing public policies.226 Just a few years after its enactment, Queen 
Anne’s Bounty was harshly criticized as upsetting the recently restored balance of power 
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between the church and the state.227   In the absence of any limiting statute or custom, 
people grew concerned that testators would make improvident charitable bequests from 
their deathbeds to the church.228 Amid this renewed anti-clergy sentiment, the English 
Parliament enacted the so-called Modern Law of Mortmain in 1736 (the “Mortmain 
Act”).229  The Mortmain Act took a different approach from the earlier mortmain statutes 
by explicitly prohibiting testamentary bequests of land to charities as well as nullifying 
inter vivos transfers of land to charity when made within twelve months of the donor’s 
death.230 Any nullified or prohibited transfer simply reverted to the donor’s heirs.231 The 
motivations behind the Mortmain Act are somewhat unclear. Some legislative history 
suggests that the Mortmain Act was aimed at preventing property from being removed 
from commerce.232 The express language of the Mortmain Act explained that its purpose 
was to prevent testators from making improvident death bead transfers of property to 
charities to the detriment of their own families.233 However, “it is probable that the anti-
clerical feeling was the most important, though unstated, reason for the act.”234 In any 
event, English law sought to find the appropriate balance between freedom of testation, 
family protection, and charitable bequests. 
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Similar experiences with the church unfolded elsewhere in Western Europe.235 Over 
time, however, most countries, including England, repealed their mortmain statutes.236 In 
England, repeal occurred first in a piecemeal fashion in the early 1900’s.237 By the 
1950’s, when England re-examined its mortmain statutes in a more comprehensive 
manner, the mortmain laws had so many exceptions that they mainly served to 
complicate law.238 In Parliament’s view, mortmain statutes were no longer needed or well 
suited for protecting testamentary freedom and family protection. Rather, by this era “the 
influence of the clergy had been greatly undermined” and other existing laws could 
protect against overreaching by the church.239   
 
C. Mortmain in the United States 
 
 Early American jurisdictions greatly valued testamentary freedom as the 
fundamental principle of wills.240 This policy continues today. In recent years, American 
courts have described the freedom of testation as a “fundamental concept”241 and a 
“specifically expressed constitutional property right.”242 The American colonies did not, 
however, import the English mortmain statutes. “[T]he English mortmain statutes were 
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never thought to be in force in this country unless they had been legislatively adopted.”243 
Many American jurisdictions did enact their own mortmain statutes. A few states 
apparently shared the traditional concern that excessive property ownership by religious 
organizations took property out of commerce. These states enacted laws restricting the 
amount of property that a religious group or charity could own.244 The more common 
concern, however, was protecting testators and their families from overreaching by 
religious groups.245 To that end, some statutes sought to balance the competing interests 
of family protection and freedom of testation. As Justice Story explained, the purpose of 
these statutes was “to prevent undue influence and imposition upon pious and feeble 
minds in their last moments, and to check an unfortunate propensity (which is sometimes 
found to exist under a bigoted fanaticism), the desire to acquire fame as religious devotee 
and benefactor at the expense of all the natural claims of blood, and parental duty.”246  
 
The American statutes took a variety of approaches. One approach simply invalidated 
all testamentary bequests to charity if made within a certain period before death.247 
Others placed a limit on the amount of property a testator could leave to a charity in his 
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will, particularly if he was survived by a wife or children.248 Some states used a 
combination of the two approaches.249 The mortmain statutes eventually proved 
unworkable for a variety of reasons. Percentage limitation mortmain statutes posed 
valuation problems, particularly when the testator owned property in more than one 
state.250 Some statutes were easily circumvented through careful drafting.251 Moreover, 
Americans did not necessarily object to all testamentary bequests to charity.252 Indeed, 
testamentary freedom remained a valued principle, as did charitable giving.253  
Americans were concerned, however, that dependent family members be protected from 
disinheritance and that testators be protected from overreaching or undue influence on the 
part of charities.254 The problem with the mortmain statutes was that, while aimed at both 
of these concerns, they were both over and under-inclusive. The statutes were over-
inclusive because they voided “many intentional bequests by testators who were not 
impermissibly influenced or who [did] not have immediate family members in need of 
protection.”255 The statutes were also under-inclusive because they failed to “affect many 
charitable gifts made without proper deliberation” nor did they “void legacies to persons 
who are in an equal position with religious persons to influence a testator.”256  In 
response to mounting dissatisfaction with mortmain statutes, some states repealed their 
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statutes voluntarily. In other states, courts held the statutes unconstitutional on a number 
of grounds including the equal protection257 and due process clauses of state and federal 
constitutions;258 and state constitutional property guarantees.259 A few lower courts held 
mortmain statutes unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds,260 but higher courts 
generally declined to address that issue.261 By 1975, mortmain statutes remained in only 
eleven states.262 In 1998, the last remaining mortmain statute—Georgia’s—was 
repealed.263  
 
The mortmain statutes “were repealed because they were unworkable, not because 
they were unnecessary.”264 Yet, the mortmain statutes were not replaced with any 
particular legislation better tailored to address the problem. Rather, it seems states were 
confident that the existing law of undue influence provided adequate safeguards.265 The 
doctrine of undue influence had emerged in both England and the United States by the 
early 1800’s.266 Initially, the doctrine was rather narrow and required proof of coercion or 
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fraud.267 Over time, courts liberalized the doctrine and expanded its scope.268 By the time 
states began to abandon their mortmain laws, the law of undue influence was firmly 
established and increasingly robust. Many states assumed that the law of undue influence 
could sufficiently protect testators and their families. That has not been the case. 
IV. THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR TODAY 
 
“Americans have long been, and continue to be, a famously charitable people.”269 
Charity plays an important—but complicated role—in this country. Beginning in the 
colonial period, charities provided important services that the government was unable or 
unwilling to provide.270  The charitable sector today is a mix of secular and religious 
organizations. When considered as a whole, however, the sector does bear some 
resemblance in terms of size, power, and benefits to the church of the past. 
 
A. Size and Scope of the Non-Profit Sector 
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The vast majority of Americans—anywhere from 64%271 to 95%272--donate money to 
charity each year. Since at least 1956, total charitable giving in the United States has been 
equal to about 2% of total GDP,273which is significantly higher than giving in any other 
country.274 In 2011, private charitable giving totaled an estimated $298.42 billion in the 
United States, which was actually a slight decrease from prior years.275  
 
In 2010, there were an estimated 2.3 million nonprofit organizations operating in the 
United States.276 These organizations include religious organizations, hospitals, 
educational organizations, colleges and universities, and organizations promoting arts, 
culture and humanities.277 In 2010, these organizations collectively accounted for 9.2% of 
all wages and, salaries paid in the U.S.278 Among those organizations required to file a 
financial return with the IRS, nonprofits reported $2.06 trillion in revenues and $4.49 
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trillion in assets for the 2010 tax year.279 In 2012, the nonprofit sector share of the 
national GDP was 5.5%.280 
 
B. Legal and Economic Benefits Enjoyed by the Non-Profit Sector 
Charities enjoy a remarkably privileged position in American law. Legislation 
enacted at all levels of government confers considerable benefits on nonprofit 
organizations. These benefits often come at the expense of taxpayers.281 Perhaps the best-
known legal and economic benefits afforded to charities are found in the tax arena. At the 
federal level, qualifying nonprofit organizations are exempt from the income tax.282 
Donors to nonprofit organizations receive their own tax benefits, including income tax 
deductions283 and gift and estate tax exemptions.284 Nonprofits with employees receive 
additional benefits. In addition to the tax-deferred retirement and pension plans available 
to for-profit organizations, nonprofit organizations have more options in the form of 
403(b) plans and §457 plans.285 Nonprofits are exempt from federal unemployment 
payroll taxes and some religious organizations may opt out of the social security 
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system.286 Nonprofit organizations are also exempt from various federal excise taxes and 
are entitled to reduced postage rates.287 At the state level, religious and charitable 
organizations often receive additional benefits in the form of exemptions from property 
taxes and sales and use taxes.288  
 
Tax benefits, however, are not the only legal and economic benefits afforded to 
nonprofit organizations by legislation. A number of antitrust laws and regulations that 
apply to for-profit organizations do not apply to nonprofits. “Schools, colleges, 
universities, public libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated 
for profit” are exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act (prohibiting price discrimination) 
in some instances.289 Most nonprofits are exempt from the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, which prohibits “unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or 
deceptive practices in commerce.”290 Nonprofit organizations are entitled to a few, but 
significant, exceptions from federal securities laws and copyright laws.291 Nonprofit 
organizations cannot be placed in an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding.292 In the labor 
and employment context, some nonprofit organizations are exempt from the National 
Labor Relations Act and religious organizations are exempt from anti-discrimination and 
civil rights laws in some instances.293 Nonprofit organizations are exempt from a variety 
of criminal laws including federal conflict of interest crimes under 18 U.S.C. §207, 
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federal anti-bribery laws, and gambling related criminal law exemptions.294 Many of 
these federal benefits have state level equivalents.295 
 
C. Policy Justifications for Legal and Economic Benefits Afforded to Charities 
 
Without question, nonprofits are favored as a matter of public policy. A good deal of 
scholarship has considered this public policy in the economic and tax policy context. 
Scholars point out that the multitude of tax benefits conferred on nonprofit organizations 
and their donors amounts to a subsidy or government expenditure for the benefit of these 
organizations.296 Several popular explanations justify the charitable subsidy. The 
traditional justification is that “subsidizing charities is ‘good’ because of the benefits they 
provide.”297 Specifically, “charities relieve the government of burdens it would otherwise 
have to bear, such as poverty relief.”298 Charities “counter[] governmental power and 
enhance[] pluralism,” “offer[] alternative viewpoints in arts and culture” and “provide[] 
creative and diverse solutions to society’s problems.”299 A newer, and increasingly 
popular justification contends that, “subsidizing charities is necessary to help them 
provide good or services that would otherwise be under-produced due to various market 
and governmental failures.”300 The nonprofit sector—and the subsidies it receives—has 
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been both applauded and criticized in recent years for a variety of reasons.301 Although 
these critiques are obviously important, they fail to consider the wisdom of this public 
policy in the context of the individual testator.  
 
D. Non-Profits & Testamentary Bequests 
   
Testamentary bequests play an important role in the financial plans of non-profit 
organizations.302 Many nonprofit organizations are looking, in part, to the Baby Boomer 
wealth transfer as an important source of funding.303 In their view “[t]he downturn is not 
going to keep people from dying, and it is not going to keep a wealth transfer from 
occurring.”304 Bequest giving already accounts for an important source of funding in the 
non-profit sector. It is estimated that testamentary bequests account for about 8% of total 
annual charitable giving.305 In 2011, that 8% amounted approximately $24.41 million.306  
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At 8%, testamentary bequests represent a small, yet significant, portion of overall 
yearly giving. That figure, however, is actually more impressive than it might seem at 
first glance. Approximately 2.5 million people died in the U.S. in 2011.307 Of those 2.5 
million, approximately 46% died without significant financial assets rendering them 
unable to leave a bequest to anyone.308 Presumably then, the $24.41 million in charitable 
bequests came in the form of a small number of rather large bequests to charity. Indeed, 
there is a significant gap between the number of Americans who donate to charity during 
life and the number of Americans who give money at death.309 Although most Americans 
donate to charity during life, only 8% of Americans name charities in their estate plans.310 
Interestingly, that 8% figure is comparable to findings in the United Kingdom311 and 
Australia.312 In the view of charities and planned giving professionals, that 8% figure 
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translates into a “giving channel” with “untapped potential” to “yield additional gifts.”313 
The nonprofit sector is expending considerable resources studying donors in order to 
“add to the body of knowledge about how fund raisers can enhance the number of 
bequests given to charitable organizations.”314  
1. How Charities Solicit Testamentary and Other Gifts: The Planned Giving 
Campaign 
 
The typical planned giving campaign involves three key steps. First, the charity 
collects data on its existing inter vivos donors. Second, the charity analyzes that data to 
identify the most likely charitable bequest donors—or “prospects.”315 Third, the charity 
directs a multifaceted marketing campaign at those donors. Each step in this process is 
sophisticated, aggressive, backed in actual research, and largely exempt from legal 
regulation. 
(a) Data Collection 
 
The first step in any planned giving campaign is to identify potential testamentary 
donors. Charities are able to collect, utilize, and share this data on their current donors, 
clients, alumni, members, and potential donors with little governmental regulation. The 
privacy laws and regulations that protect consumer information in the for-profit context 
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do not usually apply to nonprofit organizations.316 Nonprofit fundraisers are free to 
engage in practices—like telephone solicitations—that are prohibited in the commercial 
context.317 Charities, particularly the large ones, collect all sorts of information about 
their donors and potential donors. Once an organization has some very basic information 
about a person in their database—like a name and address—they can conduct formal 
research—either in house or with the help of a research company—to add to that 
information.  
 
Suppose I decide to donate $10 to a charity using the link on its website. In order to 
pay by credit card, the charity will require me to provide my full name, billing address, 
and phone number.318 Many nonprofits will require additional information such as an e-
mail address. Knowing only my name and address, a researcher can discover all sorts of 
information about me, often for free. If the charity wanted to determine whether I was a 
likely charitable bequest donor, then the charity might want to know my age, marital 
status, number and ages of children (if any), education, religious affiliation, income, and 
net worth.319 The salaries of state and federal employees are often public information. For 
other potential donors, income and net worth may be approximated. Several pieces of 
data can indicate wealth: an expensive home, other real estate holdings like vacation 
homes, a high paying occupation, owning a luxury car, owning a boat, having an 
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expensive hobby, frequent travel, and inherited wealth.320  Knowing just my name and 
address, the charity can quickly uncover most of this information. By visiting 
anybirthday.com the researcher can input my name, city, and state and determine my age. 
The researcher can use my name and address to search the local property records to see if 
I own my house, its value, and if I have a mortgage. The property record might also 
reveal my marital status. Knowing only my name and address, the researcher can quickly 
discover whether I have made any political contributions since 1980.321 If so, the 
researcher will also learn the dates, amounts, and recipients of the contribution as well as 
my occupation.322  
 
Facebook, Twitter, and other social media sites are a goldmine of information.323 
Depending on my privacy settings, the researcher may be able to determine my marital 
status, sexual orientation, race, whether I have children, their approximate ages, my 
education, employer, hobbies, interests, recent illnesses, recent travel, and a myriad of 
additional information. All of the information just described can be obtained for free, 
online, with just a few minutes worth of research. Already the researcher has obtained the 
data necessary to see whether I meet a number of the demographic markers of a likely 
charitable bequest donor.324 Of course, the researcher could do a little more work and 
discover even more information about me relevant to charitable bequests. For example, 
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the researcher may be able to determine my actual salary, my pattern of charitable giving 
to other organizations, my social and professional affiliations, and my private business 
holdings.  
 
(b) Analyzing the Data 
 
A growing body of research identifies the characteristics of living donors who make 
charitable bequests and explains the factors that motivate those bequests. The existing 
research is interesting. Most lifetime donors do not leave money to charity at death.325 
One study found that 90.6% of donors who gave at least $500 to a charity during life, did 
not leave any money to charity at death.326 The decision to donate money during life 
apparently involves a different decision-making process than the decision to leave money 
at death. A recent functional MRI study revealed that deciding to leave a charitable 
bequest involved a different brain region than the decision to donate money or time 
during life.327 Researchers are working to identify the differences in that decision making 
process in order to convert lifetime donors into bequest donors. Studies consistently show 
that family makeup is strongly related to whether a person will leave a charitable bequest. 
Testators who are married or who have children or grandchildren are generally less likely 
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to make charitable bequests.328 However, parents appear more likely to leave charitable 
bequests when their children have higher incomes of their own.329 Although, it appears 
that “no other indicator is as strong as childlessness” other demographic factors are 
important.330 The likelihood of making a charitable bequest increases with education 
level—with graduate degree holders being the most likely to leave a charitable 
bequest.331 Being solicited by a charity for a bequest gift is positively associated with 
making a bequest gift.332 Other characteristics positively associated with making a 
charitable bequest include: volunteering for the charity, attending religious services, 
higher socioeconomic status, income, and previous cancer diagnosis.333  
(c) Marketing Campaign 
 
Once the nonprofit identifies a pool of likely bequest donor prospects, it will deploy a 
multifaceted marketing campaign soliciting a charitable bequest. Marketing can help 
create desires that previously did not exist.334 The marketing campaign starts early—
years before research suggests the prospect is likely to actually make the gift.335 
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Marketing campaigns often start with a variety of direct mailings, including post cards, 
newsletters, annual reports, and magazines.336 The direct mail is sent to a large group of 
potential donors with the knowledge that most of them will not actually respond to the 
direct mail.337 Rather, the direct mail campaign is intended to influence the prospects so 
that “the ground is softer for the next promotion.”338 Post cards have the benefit of being 
inexpensive to produce and mail. They also have higher readership rates than other forms 
of direct mail.339 Newsletters and magazines will generally include some “compelling 
donor stories that tug at the heartstrings of [the] audience.”340  
 
Research suggests that one barrier to charitable bequests is people do not believe they 
are wealthy enough to make those gifts.341 To overcome that barrier, newsletters and 
magazines will include personalized stories about existing donors that are similarly 
situated to the prospect financially.342 The goal of these personal accounts is to “simply 
and effectively bring home the message to prospects through sharing living examples of 
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people ‘just like them’ who were able to make personally-significant planned gifts.”343 
The personal accounts have the added benefit of convincing prospects that bequest giving 
is a social norm and is expected of them.344 “Studies show that people help more when 
they are exposed to role models who help, presumably because the model provides 
information about the social norms for and the consequences of helping.”345 The 
marketing campaign will also include events, e-mail, and a website.346 Once the ground is 
thoroughly “softened” the nonprofit will follow up with phone calls and personal 
visits.347 During the first visit the nonprofit’s representative will simply thank a prospect 
for a recent annual gift and try to find out more information about the prospect.348 The 
representative will then follow up with the prospect with meetings and phone calls and 
will eventually begin to broach the issue of a bequest gift.349  
 
Another perceived barrier to charitable bequests is convincing current inter vivos 
donors to execute a will. A number of polls and studies estimate that anywhere from 50% 
to 65% of Americans do not have a will.350 Many people delay writing wills because of 
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the cost351 and discomfort discussing death.352 Savvy nonprofits overcome this barrier by 
offering free estate planning seminars and estate planning services to their donors and 
volunteers.353 Consumer research suggests that we are highly motivated when offered 
something for free.354  Moreover, nonprofits seek to offer these services at key milestones 
when potential donors are most likely to write or re-write a will: “births, marriages, 
retirements, [and] family members’ deaths.”355  
V. INADEQUATE RESTRAINTS ON CHARITABLE GIVING AND 
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
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Sneaky Retail Tricks, CBS NEWS, April 29, 2011, available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505144_162-41541822/pricing-psychology-7-sneaky-
retail-tricks/. 
355 Love, supra note __, at A20 
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 The existing rules aimed at ensuring testamentary freedom and family protection are 
poorly suited for protecting testators and their families from the overreaching of charities. 
The few laws and reported decisions touching on the issue demonstrate a fundamental 
misunderstanding of how nonprofits today solicit testamentary bequests. They also 
illustrate how this misunderstanding has not only led to an imbalance, but also, to the 
potential exploitation of testators and their families by the nonprofit sector.  The problem 
is evident in several contexts.  
A. Interested Parties 
The rule prohibiting an interested party from serving as a witness to a will or 
participating in its drafting serves an important function. By prohibiting bequests to 
witnesses, the rule seeks to “preserve the integrity of the process of will executions by 
removing the possibility that attesting witnesses who receive a disposition under the will 
might give false testimony in support of the will to protect their legacies.”356 The 
requirement seeks “to prevent fraud or undue influence by a witness to a will to thwart 
the intention of the [testator].”357 For thousands of years this rule has sought to maintain 
the integrity of the testamentary process. In an effort to procure more property for itself, 
the church successfully eroded this requirement during the middle ages.358 Abuse was 
rampant and the public lost confidence in the church and the sanctity of the testamentary 
process. Over time, the law again prohibited interested parties from serving as witnesses 
to wills or participating in their drafting. In recent years, however, the strength of this rule 
                                                
356 Estate of Morea, 645 N.Y. S. 2d 1022, 1022-23 (Surg. Ct. 1996). 
357 In re Johnson’s Estate, 347 So. 2d 785, 787 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977). Accord In re Small’s 
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358 See Part ____, supra. 
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has waned again. The UPC “scrapped the requirement that witnesses be disinterested in 
the will.”359 According to the UPC’s official comment, “[t]he requirement of 
disinterested witnesses has not succeeded in preventing fraud and undue influence; and in 
most cases of undue influence, the influencer is careful not to sign as a witness, but to 
procure disinterested witnesses.”360 The comment further explains that, “attorneys will 
continue to use disinterested witnesses in the execution of wills.”361 This view, which is 
shared by a number of respected scholars, is misplaced. When interested parties are 
intimately involved in the testamentary process it casts a cloud over the legitimacy of the 
entire process and undermines public confidences. The ability of an heir to bring an 
undue influence claim does absolutely nothing to remedy that harm. If anything, 
increased litigation over testaments exacerbates that harm. Undue influence claims are 
notoriously difficult to prove—particularly where the primary witnesses to the 
testamentary process have an incentive to give self-serving testimony. Undue influence 
cases are expensive and can rip a family apart in the process. The UPC’s faith that 
attorneys will exercise good judgment in selecting witnesses is sadly misplaced.362 
Moreover, the UPC seems to presuppose that the influencer has a malicious intent to 
defraud the testator and will take steps to cover his tracks. That is not necessarily true—
                                                
359 James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 
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particularly in the case of charitable bequests.363 When the representative of a charity 
improperly procures a bequest for a charity, does that necessarily make him a bad actor? 
More likely, he is either doing his job as part of the organization’s fundraising team or he 
is genuinely interested in the success of the charity. Undoubtedly, many, if not most, 
members of the clergy in the middle-ages were similarly motivated and they did not 
attempt to conceal their involvement in the testamentary process. Their intimate 
involvement in the testamentary process, however, harmed testators, harmed testators’ 
families, harmed the church, and undermined public confidence in the entire process.  
 
Today, the scope of the problem varies by jurisdiction. A number of states continue to 
require disinterested witnesses and scriveners. Courts, however, often decline to apply 
those laws in the context of charitable bequest.  
1. Refusal of Courts to Apply the Existing Disinterested Witness Rule to 
Charities 
 
 A number of jurisdictions continue to expressly prohibit an interested party from 
serving as a witness. These jurisdictions, by statute, impose a variety of penalties—the 
thrust of which is to typically deny a bequest made to a witness. In practice, courts tend 
to interpret the statutes as requiring a direct pecuniary benefit to the witness.364 Relying 
                                                
363 It appears that courts also share this unfounded view. See e.g. In re Hamm, 262 N.W. 
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364 See, e.g., In re Wolfner’s Estate, 188 N.E. 2d 712, 714 (Ill. 1963) (“The interest which 
disqualifies a witness must be such an interest in the will that a pecuniary fain or loss will 
come to him directly as the immediate result of is provisions.”); Triestman v. Kilgore, 
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on the direct pecuniary interest requirement, some courts have refused to apply these 
statutes in the charitable bequest context. Courts essentially draw a dividing line between 
the charitable organization itself and its members and representatives reasoning that a 
witness’ membership in the charitable organization does not void a bequest to that charity 
“because the member’s interest is too indirect to be a disqualifying interest.”365 In some 
cases, this approach makes sense. For example, In re Potter’s Will involved a charitable 
bequest to the town of Pawlet for upkeep of roads and bridges.366 All three witnesses to 
the will were residents of the town and taxpayers, and, therefore, would all benefit from 
the charitable bequest.367 If the court had applied the disinterested witness requirement 
strictly, then, presumably, no one in the entire town could serve as a witness—an 
obviously absurd result. Rather, the court reasoned that “[n]o one of the witnesses to this 
will had a fixed, certain, and vested pecuniary interest in the will, and so no one of them 
was incompetent because of that interest.”368  
 
Courts consistently refuse to apply the applicable statute even where the witness’ 
interest in the charitable bequest is more direct and the witnesses have an obvious interest 
in the outcome of the will. Estate of Tkachuk illustrates this point.369 In that case the 
decedent wrote a will leaving the bulk of his property to the church.370 At the decedent’s 
                                                                                                                                            
838 S.W. 2d 547, 547 (Tex. 1992) (“A competent witness to a will is one who receives 
no pecuniary benefit under its terms.”). 
365 Estate of Tkachuk, 139 Cal. Rptr. 55, 58 (1977).  
366 95 A. 646, 647 (Vt. 1915). 
367 Id.  
368 Id. 
369 139 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1977). Accord Estate of Jordan, 519 S.W. 2d 902 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1975); In re Giacomini’s Estate, 603 P. 2d 218 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979). 
370 139 Cal. Rptr. at 56. 
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request, Reverend Myczka typed the decedent’s will, accompanied the decedent to a 
notary’s office, and signed as a witness to the will.371 Reverend Myczka was employed 
by the church and served as an officer, treasurer, and member of the executive 
committee.372 The decedent’s brother later challenged the bequest to the church under an 
existing statute that invalidated bequests to subscribing witnesses.373 The court conceded 
that the Reverend Myczka was not an entirely disinterested witness in light of his position 
as an officer of the church.374 However, the court upheld the bequest to the church 
reasoning that the language of the statute “does not void gifts to a beneficiary where one 
of the subscribing witnesses, who is not a beneficiary, is interested in the bequest.”375 The 
court construed the language of the applicable statute narrowly and reasoned that the 
bequest in question was to the church, not Reverend Myczka.376  
 
Some courts go further and uphold the testament even where the witness does 
receive a direct pecuniary benefit. In these cases, the courts reason that the pecuniary 
benefit involved is not the type of benefit envisioned by the statute. Estate if Giacomini 
illustrates this approach.377 Robert Davis, an attorney prepared the decedent’s will, which 
left the bulk of her estate to several charitable beneficiaries.378 Mr. Davis, who was also a 
subscribing witness to the will, stood to receive a number of pecuniary benefits. The will 
named Mr. Davis as executor, without bond; and gave him the power to employ his own 
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law firm and to pay the firm without prior court approval.379 Further, Mr. Davis held 
positions with two of the charitable beneficiaries—serving as a member of the board of 
trustees of one organization, and serving on the fund-raising advisory council of the 
other.380 Yet, the court held that Mr. Davis did not stand to benefit from the will and, 
therefore, could serve as a witness without any consequences.381 In reaching its 
conclusion, the court reasoned that his appointment as executor was not the type of 
pecuniary interest that would disqualify him as a witness because it only entitled him to 
be compensated for labor he would perform in a fiduciary capacity.382  
Courts should construe these statutes more broadly and jurisdictions that have 
adopted the UPC approach should reconsider. In a case like that of Reverend Myczka, the 
court should not draw a distinction between the charity’s representative and the charity 
itself. Because a charity can only act through its representatives, that distinction is 
nonsensical. When a charity’s representative is intimately involved in the drafting and 
execution of a testament it casts doubt on the integrity of the entire process. Voiding 
bequests under such circumstances serves as a meaningful deterrent and can help avoid 
the harm associated with subsequent undue influence litigation. The direct pecuniary 
interest requirement, as illustrated in Giacomini, should likewise be interpreted more 
broadly. The fact that Mr. Davis was an attorney and that his sizeable pecuniary interest 
in the estate and its administration required him to perform services does not remove the 
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taint of the impropriety of his actions. Indeed, those very facts tend to undermine public 
confidence in the legal profession as a whole.383 
2. Rules Requiring Disinterested Scrivener Inapplicable 
 
Most jurisdictions have no affirmative law prohibiting a party who prepares a will 
from benefitting under its terms. The UPC is silent on the issue and many jurisdictions 
simply consider a benefit received by the drafter as a factor in an undue influence 
analysis. This presents the exact same set of problems as allowing interested witnesses. 
The few states that do address the issue by statute fail to adequately address interested 
scriveners in the charitable context. For example, Kansas invalidates any “provision in a 
will, written or prepared for another person, that gives the writer or the writer’s or 
preparer’s parent, children, issue, sibling, or spouse any devise or bequest…”384 The 
statute is simply inapplicable in the charitable context. California goes somewhat further 
and invalidates bequests to the party who drafted the will or otherwise has a fiduciary or 
business relationship with the testator.385 Although the scope of the California prohibition 
is broad, nonprofit organizations are specifically excluded.386 In enacting the statutory 
exception benefiting non-profits the legislature acknowledged the need to protect 
testators from the undue influence of fiduciaries.387 The legislature decided to exempt 
nonprofit organizations from the scope of the prohibition in order to encourage charitable 
                                                
383 See e.g. Gerald P. Johnston, An Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning 
Practices—Is Good Business Bad Ethics?, 45 OHIO ST. L. J. 57, 83-88 (1984). 
384 KAN. STAT. §59-605. 
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bequests and “ensure that particular recipients of transfers are not disqualified as 
beneficiaries simply because the drafted the language of the transferring instrument.”388 
This approach ignores the well-documented history of overreaching by the church in 
drafting testamentary instruments. 
 
In most jurisdictions, the only rule discouraging scriveners from preparing 
testaments in their own favor are the ethical rules governing the legal profession. While 
these professional responsibility rules are well founded, they are wholly insufficient. 
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(c) prevents a lawyer from soliciting a bequest 
for himself or his family and from preparing an instrument where he receives a 
bequest.389 Every jurisdiction has some comparable prohibition. Rule 1.8 is aimed at—
among other things—protecting testators from undue influence.390 The rule does not 
adequately protect testators from overreaching.391  In many jurisdictions, the rules of 
professional conduct do not have the force of law.392 In those jurisdictions, a violation of 
Rule 1.8 will not render a testamentary bequest invalid and may not result in significant 
disciplinary action against the attorney.393 Even if a violation of Rule 1.8 does not 
invalidate a bequest, most jurisdictions would consider the violation as evidence 
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supporting an undue influence claim.394 However, courts resist that approach in the 
charitable context and will apply the pecuniary interest analysis to determine that the 
attorney did not benefit from the charitable bequest.395 Moreover, the rules of 
professional responsibility do not apply to non-lawyers. In a case like Tkachuk where the 
party drafting the will is not a lawyer, the drafting party is not bound by the rules of 
professional responsibility and cannot be punished for their violation. With the 
availability of will drafting software, virtually anyone can draft a valid testament without 
the assistance of an attorney.396 
 
B. Refusal of Courts to Apply Undue Influence in the Charitable Context 
 
Undue influence could provide a meaningful remedy from overreaching by charities 
and their representatives if courts were willing to apply the law in the charitable context. 
Yet, courts consistently refuse to afford facts indicating undue influence appropriate 
evidentiary weight when a charity and its representatives are involved.  The problem is 
evident at nearly every stage of the undue influence analysis. 
1. Confidential Relationship 
 
The existence of a confidential relationship is a threshold issue in most undue 
influence cases. Courts have repeatedly found reliant-type confidential relationships 
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where one person relies on another to select an attorney and provide financial 
guidance.397 A nonprofit whose representatives provide estate planning and similar 
financial services to donors should be held to that same standard.  
 
In furthering their planned giving campaigns, nonprofits routinely solicit their 
prospects to execute wills.398 A popular solicitation technique involves explaining the tax 
and economic benefits available to charitable bequest donors.399 Indeed, “the 
deductibility of charitable bequests enhances the attractiveness of leaving a portion of 
one's estate to charity.”400 Many planned giving officers themselves hold advanced 
degrees in law and accounting. When the nonprofits are successful it is hardly surprising 
that the prospect may ask the nonprofit’s representative to suggest what attorney he 
should visit. The representative will gladly do so, taking advantage of the special trust 
and confidence the donor has bestowed upon it and will even foot the bill for the expense. 
Some nonprofits address attorney recommendation situations proactively by retaining 
attorneys ahead of time so that they may offer estate-planning services to their prospects 
free of charge. The relationship bears all the hallmarks of a confidential relationship, yet 
courts are hesitant to find a confidential relationship in a charitable bequest setting. In the 
view of some courts, “[i]t is not improper for charitable organizations to offer estate 
planning advice, including plans for charitable donations.”401  
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I disagree. History amply illustrates the impropriety of the representatives of a 
charitable organization taking over the testamentary process. When the representative of 
a charitable organization successfully solicits a testator to write a will naming the 
organization as a beneficiary, helps the testator select an attorney, and foots the bill for 
the services a confidential relationship exists and the courts should recognize this simple 
and obvious fact. The refusal or courts to find a confidential relationship in the charitable 
context is especially troubling because the existence of a confidential relationship is a 
threshold issue in many jurisdictions. Even in those jurisdictions that do not expressly 
require a finding of a confidential relationship, the existence of a confidential relationship 
strongly supports a finding of the other required elements of an undue influence claim.  
In Campbell, the testator, Mrs. Campbell, developed a close friendship with Mr. 
Upchuch, a university’s planning giving officer.402 Mrs. Campbell sought Mr. 
Upchurch’s advice on arranging her long-term financial and physical care. After moving 
to property adjacent to the university, Mrs. Campbell asked Mr. Upchurch to recommend 
an attorney to help prepare her estate planning documents and to make an appointment 
for her. Mr. Upchurch not only located an attorney—the university’s general counsel—he 
attended the meetings with Ms. Campbell and corresponded with the attorney regarding 
Mrs. Campbell’s plans. Mr. Upchurch even arranged for the university to pay the 
attorney’s bill. Mrs. Campbell obviously had a relationship of trust and confidence with 
Mr. Upchurch. However, the court was unwilling to rule that Mr. Upchurch, and in turn, 
the university, had a confidential relationship with Mrs. Campbell at the relevant time. 
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Estate of Brevard presents a less sophisticated charity representative than 
Campbell, but is equally troubling.403 The testator, Ms. Brevard, allegedly asked Pastor 
Barlowe to help her prepare a testament. Pastor Barlowe was friends with Ms. Brevard 
and she often attended his church. Pastor Barlowe purchased will drafting software and 
prepared Ms. Brevard’s testament for her. The testament named Pastor Barlowe as 
executor and his church as contingent beneficiary. Ms. Brevard’s relatives challenged her 
will on the grounds of undue influence. On appeal, one issue before the court was 
whether Pastor Barlow had a confidential relationship with Ms. Brevard. The court 
conceded that had Pastor Barlow been an actual attorney he and Ms. Brevard would have 
had a confidential relationship as a matter of law when he prepared her will. However, 
the court was unwilling to extend that rule to a person engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law. In the attorney-client context, “heightened scrutiny exists because 
attorneys; superior knowledge of the law is assumed to give them an unfair advantage 
when conducting business transactions with clients.”404 However, the concern in the case 
of Pastor Barlow was different in the view of the court. “The danger inherent in the 
unauthorized practice of law is not that the unauthorized practitioner will use superior 
legal knowledge to take advantage of a ‘client,’ but that the ‘client’ will be harmed by the 
unauthorized practitioner’s lack of knowledge.”405 The court’s analysis completely 
misses the point. The appropriate inquiry is whether a confidential relationship exists. 
Where a non-attorney seeks to act as an attorney he should be held to the same legal 
standard as an attorney. 
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2. Susceptibility, Opportunity, Disposition, and Coveted Result 
In addition to the existence of a confidential relationship, a finding of undue 
influence typically requires evidence of susceptibility, opportunity, disposition, and a 
coveted result. A successful planned giving campaign bears the hallmarks of each of 
these factors but courts often refuse to give this fact sufficient evidentiary weight. 
(a) Susceptibility 
 
In determining susceptibility, the court asks whether the testator was susceptible to 
the influence of the alleged influencer.406 The testator’s personal qualities are relevant.407 
Illness, incapacity, old age, social isolation, declining mental abilities and similar factors 
all indicate of susceptibility.408 This vulnerable population is exactly the population 
targeted by nonprofit organizations for bequests because they are the most likely to make 
those bequests. Planned giving campaigns are actually designed to make potential donors 
more susceptible to the suggestions of the nonprofit and its representatives. Direct 
mailings and other early contacts with potential donors help cultivate desires and soften 
the ground long before the non-profit’s representative ever makes personal contact. Once 
a non-profit’s representative actually contacts the testator personally he is more likely to 
be receptive to the representative’s suggestions. 
Courts, however, are hesitant to recognize this susceptibility to influence in the 
charitable context. In Osborn, the decedent left the bulk of her estate to the local Catholic 
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Diocese.409 Her sister brought an unsuccessful undue influence challenge. The testator’s 
sister alleged, among other things, that the testator was “dependent upon the Clergy as 
her means of social outlet.”410 The court saw nothing unusual about the elderly testator’s 
relationship with and reliance on the church as her means of social outlet.411 
(b) Opportunity 
 
Opportunity is, perhaps, the easiest factor to establish in undue influence cases. 
Opportunity simply requires evidence that the alleged influencer had the opportunity to 
exercise undue influence. Opportunity generally requires that the alleged influencer spent 
a meaningful amount of time alone with the testator.412 A confidential or familial 
relationship tends to support a finding of opportunity. Involvement in the preparation of 
the testament also suggests opportunity. Some courts are still hesitant to recognize the 
existence of opportunity in the charitable context. For example, in Herman v. Kogan the 
court found no opportunity overreaching on the part of the attorney or charity where (1) 
the charity’s attorney prepared the will; (2) the attorney was also the regional president of 
the charity; (3) all of the witnesses to the testament were officers of the charity; (4) the 
executors named in the will were officers of the corporation; (5) the will was deposited at 
the offices of the corporation; and (6) the attorney apparently did not charge a fee for his 
                                                
409 470 N.E. 2d 1114, 1116 (Ill. Ct. App. 1984). 
410 Id. 
411 Id. at 1117. 
412 See e.g In re Sechrest, 537 S.E. 2d 511, 516 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)(“The evidence is 
further undisputed that prior to Harold’s death, Mowery had little contact with the 
testatrix and, thus, had virtually no opportunity to exert his will over hers.”); In re 
Schroeder, 441 N.W. 2d 527, 532 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (“Leslie Schroeder had an 
opportunity to exercise undue influence because he was the decedent’s husband, her 
attorney, and he drafted her will.”). 
 74 
services.413 Despite this overwhelming evidence, the court found uninformative, largely 
irrelevant, and obviously self-serving testimony of the attorney and other officers of the 
charity sufficiently compelling to dispel any presumption of overreaching or undue 
influence. 
(c) Disposition 
 
Disposition requires a finding that the alleged influencer had “a disposition to 
influence unduly for the purpose of procuring an improper favor.”414 “Disposition means 
something more than a mere desire to obtain a share of another’s estate.”415 Rather, 
disposition “implies a willingness to do something wrong or unfair, and grasping or 
overreaching characteristics.”416 Courts are hesitant to view the actions of charities and 
representatives as rising to this level. In Estate of Davis v. Cook the decedent left her 
nearly $2,000,000 residuary estate to Schreiner College, the school attended by her long 
deceased son.417 Schreiner’s development officer began to visit Mrs. Davis in 1994. At 
the time, she was 98-years old, “lonely, isolated, and plagued with physical 
infirmities.”418 Schreiner’s development officer offered estate-planning advice to Mrs. 
Davis. Schreiner also “made pleas to [Mrs. Davis] which involved flattery, appeals to 
patriotism and self worth, glorification of the memory of her deceased son, and the allure 
of membership in the Schreiner Oaks Society, an honorary society for Schreiner 
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contributors.”419 The court, however, sustained summary judgment upholding the will 
finding that less than “a scintilla of probative evidence” gave rise to a genuine issue of 
material fact.420 
(d) Coveted Result 
 
The coveted result element asks “whether [the alleged influencer” has, for no 
apparent reason, been favored in the will to the exclusion of a natural object of the 
testator’s bounty.”421 Courts typically define ‘natural objects of one’s bounty’ based upon 
the particular circumstances surrounding a case.422  “[O]rdinarily, all things being equal, 
the natural objects of a testator's bounty are those who unless a will exists will inherit his 
property.”423  When a testator has no spouse or children, collateral relatives fall squarely 
within this description because they are the testator’s likely heirs in intestacy. When 
collateral heirs challenge a bequest made to a charity, however, courts are quick to 
dismiss the idea that a collateral heir might be the natural object of the testator’s bounty. 
In Estate of Davis v. Cook, for example, the decedent left her nearly $2 million residual 
estate to charity to the exclusion of collateral relatives.424 In considering the naturalness 
of the bequest the court explained that “excluding collateral heirs in favor of charities is 
not unnatural.”425 The opinion fails to discuss whether the testator and her collateral 
relatives had a close relationship despite the obvious relevance of such an inquiry. In re 
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Campbell426 is similar. The testator gave the bulk of her estate to a college rather than her 
siblings, nieces and nephews.427 The testator had provided for her family under several 
prior wills and enjoyed a close relationship with her family.428 Despite those facts, the 
court concluded that her relatives were not the “direct sort of natural objects of her 
bounty, the testator’s “interest in charity was evident,”429 and the university demonstrated 
the transaction was “open, fair, and honest.”430 Some courts go further and expressly 
declare charities to be the natural objects of a testator’s bounty. In Estate of Overton, the 
court explained that testator’s gratitude to the hospital for the positive outcome from 
cataract surgery “made the Minnesota Medical Foundation a natural object of her 
bounty.”431  
Courts also refuse to recognize the benefits that actually inure to the benefit of the 
attorney, executor, or planned giving officer. Burke v. Kehr is typical.432 Mr. Kehr, the 
decedent’s attorney, drafted and witnessed her will. The will appointed him as her 
independent personal representative and, in that capacity, gave him the authority to 
distribute the residue of her estate to whatever charitable organizations he selected. Yet, 
the court held that there “was no evidence of the existence of a substantial benefit to 
Kehr…”433 In the court’s view, the significant compensation Kehr would receive as 
personal representative was immaterial because these were “fees for services.”434 “Such 
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earned fees do not constitute the type of substantial economic benefit which gives rise to 
a presumption of undue influence.”435 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 Throughout the history of the law of wills, society struggled to strike the 
appropriate balance between freedom of testation, protection of families from 
disinheritance and charitable giving. Intertwined in that balance was realization that 
religious organizations possessed the ability to frustrate both freedom of testation and 
family protection. Restrains on charitable bequests existed in our law for many years. 
However, in recent years virtually all restraint is gone. Charitable giving certainly serves 
a societal good. However, courts and legislatures should reconsider the deference 
afforded charitable bequests in the law order to ensure the appropriate balance is 
maintained.  Especially in light of a potential “golden age of philanthropy” considered to 
be a product of an anticipated generational transfer of wealth, it is particularly important 
the safeguards afforded to ensuring testamentary freedom and family security, 
particularly by the doctrine of undue influence and the interested witness rule, begin to 
shield testators from overreaching charities within the context of charitable testamentary 
bequests. The competing public policies ensuring and providing for testamentary 
freedom, family protection and charitable giving should begin to operate in a way that 
they provide a checks and balances for one another and curb the imbalance toward 
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charitable giving which may help to prevent the mass exploitation of this anticipated 
generational transfer of wealth by the nonprofit sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
